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We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, 
tied in a single garment of destiny. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.   
Bringing about  systemic education reform is like kicking a stone uphill:  
A swift swing of a strong leg is enough to get it going, 
but keeping it going may call for something else entirely.
Stone, Henig, Jones & Pierannunzi 
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San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 210. 
2 Stone, C. N., Henig, J. R., Jones, B. D., & Pierannunzi,
C. (2001). Building Civic Capacity: The Politics of
Reform ing Urban Schools. Lawrence, Kansas:
University Press of Kansas, 142. 
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Building Civic Capacity 
In May 2007, the School District of
Philadelphia was in crisis again. After several
years of reform progress and growing public
conﬁdence, a major budget shortfall resulted in
a slew of proposed cuts in programs and 
services and an onslaught of negative media
coverage.3 Parents, local leaders, youth, and
community organizations were outraged—
and not just by the cuts. Angry Philadelphians
berated district leaders for a six-year history
of behind-closed-doors decisions, creeping
 privatization of a public system, and a lack of
accountability to tax-paying citizens. District
leaders, meanwhile, struggled to reassure an
anxious public and staunch the ﬂow of red ink.4
Dramatic as these events were, to focus on the
spectacle of civic protests, fractious meetings,
and ﬁery editorials would be to miss the more
persistent problem. Earlier protests that had
accompanied the 2001 state takeover abated
quickly, with the public seemingly willing to
grant the district a honeymoon period.
Additional money from the state and city, a
stream of positive press about the schools, and
a rapid unfolding of reform initiatives created
a sense of momentum and change. Public
assent continued as, over the next few years,
the district reported improvement in student
achievement in the early grades. In the face of
a budget crisis, however, this apparent stability
and conﬁdence dissolved. Why was public
support for district leadership and the reform
agenda so fragile? 
Under state takeover, the School Reform
Commission (SRC) replaced a mayoral-
appointed Board of Education. Consisting of
three gubernatorial and two mayoral appoint-
ments, the SRC was granted unprecedented
powers.5 Decision making became concentrated
in the hands of a few, and there was an
absence of mechanisms for broad public
 consultation. As long as the district was
able to maintain the appearance of progress,
the public did not balk. The lack of public
consultation about the priorities of the district,
however, meant that public conﬁdence easily
broke down in a time of crisis. Those who
should have been the SRC’s natural allies
in facing its underlying problems, such as
chronically insufﬁcient resources, instead
began to challenge its spending priorities.
Also simmering just beneath the surface of
the apparent public peace were deep-seated
concerns about the equity and fairness of the
system. In essence, the recent eruption of
 tensions in Philadelphia was an indicator
that this reform era had not generated civic
capacity—the kind of broad district, civic,
and community collaboration needed to
 forward and support a reform agenda.6 
5 Useem, E., Christman, J. B., & Boyd, W. L.
(2006, July). The Role of District Leadership in
Radical Reform: Philadelphia’s Experience under
the State Takeover, 2001-2006. Philadelphia:
Research for Action. 
6 Stone, C. N. et al., 2001; Stone, C. N. (2006).
Thoughts about Civic Capacity. Unpublished
Manuscript. 
3 As early as February 2007, district officials pro-
jected a budget deficit of more than $100 Million
(Snyder & Woodall, 2/13/07). By May 2007, the
reported deficit had increased to $182 Million
(Snyder, 5/30/07), although other estimates existed
and varied slightly. During the months following, the
district worked to reduce this number through a
series of cuts in programs and personnel; in addi-
tion, the district looked towards more revenue from
the city and state (Snyder, 8/16/07). 
4 Dean, M. & Russ, V. (2007, May 30). Under
Pressure, Reform Panel Balks. [Electronic Version]
Philadelphia Daily News; Snyder, S. (2007, May
30). Outcry Grows over Phila. School Cuts.
[Electronic Version] Philadelphia Inquirer; Snyder,
S., Woodall, M., & Mucha, P. (2007, May 31). SRC
Passes Phila. School Budget over Objections.
[Electronic Version] Philadelphia Inquirer. 
Key Components of Civic Capacity 
• Community and civic sectors put aside
individual interests to pursue the 
collective good. 
• Elite and low-income constituencies 
collaborate as equals. 
• Actors move beyond talk to mobilize
resources and achieve concrete goals. 
Understanding Civic Capacity
For the past several decades, large urban
 districts like Philadelphia have been host to
dozens of reform efforts. Yet, all too often,
these efforts failed to bring about lasting
 beneﬁts for students, with one reform simply
replacing another, and teachers, parents, and
the public becoming increasingly frustrated
with the lack of progress and disenchanted
with the schools.7 Because these districts face
such signiﬁcant challenges—from the
entrenched poverty of so many of their
 students, to perennial budget shortfalls, to
unwieldy bureaucratic structures—improve-
ment will happen only when reform efforts
go beyond quick ﬁxes to address underlying
problems. As Stone and his colleagues explain
in their study of the politics of urban school
reform:
If change is to occur and reform is
to stick, then subsystem relations
need to be altered in a lasting way….
This is what makes fundamental
reform so difficult. It calls for more
than bringing short-term pressure
to bear on an existing relationship;
instead, it calls for altering
 relationships.8 
Districts do not reform by themselves. This
sort of ambitious change will only happen
with signiﬁcant involvement on the part of
a city’s civic sector—its local leaders, com -
munity organizations, youth, and parents.
Yet activity alone is not enough. Often, reform
efforts founder because individual or group
interests take precedence over a collective
agenda. Reforms with such “shallow roots”
are easily disrupted and do not create lasting
change.9 Mistrust and ill will, not meaningful
reform, inevitably occur when education is not
treated as a “community enterprise,” say
scholars who have documented the importance
of a broad district, civic, and community col-
laboration to the success of school improve-
ment efforts across a number of cities.10
In a comparative study of urban school
reform, Stone and his colleagues found that
cities with high levels of civic capacity were
far more successful in designing, implement-
ing, and sustaining meaningful reform than
cities that lacked such a resource.11 While
civic capacity may take different forms in dif-
ferent cities, it is generally made up of three
key ingredients. First, various sectors of the
community must put aside individual interests
to come together and pursue the collective
good of educational improvement. Second,
civic capacity involves broad participation in
setting the educational agenda, such that all
constituencies—including low-income and
minority populations—are represented and
collaborate as equals to make key decisions.
Finally, individuals and groups must be 
willing to mobilize the human, ﬁnancial, 
and material resources needed to achieve
reform goals. When all of these things come
together, they help create reform agendas that
are equitable, enjoy wide and deep support,
and can be sustained over time, even in the
face of budget crises and changes in leader-
ship. (For more detail on “Civic Capacity in
Action,” see box, Page 3.)
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7 Hess, F. M. (1999). Spinning Wheels: The Politics
of Urban School Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press.
8 Stone, C. N. et al., 2001, 7. 
9 Cuban, L. & Usdan, M. (2002). Powerful Reforms
with Shallow Roots: Improving America’s Urban
Schools. New York: Teachers College Press.
10 Henig, J. R. & Stone, C. N. (2007). Civic
Capacity and Education Reform: The Case for
School - Community Realignment. In Rothberg, R.
A., City Schools: How Districts and Communities
Can Create Smart Education Systems (117-136).
Cambridge: Harvard Education Press.
11 Stone, C. N. et al., 2001. 
• In Mobile, Alabama in 2002
more than 48  community
 conversations focused on
 community members’ goals
for Mobile schools and the
challenges they faced, which,
in conjunction with research by
parents and educators about
school reform nationally, result-
ed in a document that set forth
reform priorities for Mobile
schools. This document
became the basis for a strate-
gic plan for the district, and
was adopted by the school
board in 2003.12 
• The El Paso Collaborative
for Academic Excellence is
a combined effort of the
University of Texas, the El Paso
Interreligious Sponsoring
Organization (EPISO), local
Cham bers of Commerce,
 elected officials and education
officials, the Texas Education
Agency and the local com -
munity college. 
Together, in 1991, these enti-
ties, with strong professional
leadership, began looking at
data from the Texas Education
Agency in order to highlight
general education problems
and their equity dimensions.
In determining their focus, the
Collaborative connected the
changing demographics of the
city and the city’s future well-
being to the need to raise aca-
demic performance, thus
building bridges between edu-
cators and the business sector.
Over the next two decades the
Collaborative mobilized to
ensure that schools in El Paso
districts use data and self-
examination as a basis for pro-
fessional development for
teachers and for development
of school-level teams of educa-
tors, parents and administra-
tors who focus on the goal of
teaching all students a
demanding curriculum.13
• Boston benefited from the
stability of a strong working
relationship between city gov-
ernment and the school
superintendent for over a
decade, beginning in the mid-
1990s. The efforts of the
mayor and superintendent
have been augmented by the
Boston Plan for Excellence,
which is made up of both
elite and grassroots sectors of
the community, and which
researched and co-designed
key aspects of Boston school
reform. This reform era built
on earlier as well as current
efforts of the Boston
Compact, which has procured
resources and support from
the city’s elites for the
schools. Grassroots groups
have been dedicated to organ-
izing parents and  giving voice
to those without access to
equal educational opportunity,
but have had less decision-
making power in the reform.14
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Civic Capacity in Philadelphia
In this report, Research for Action aims to
assess the state of civic capacity for education
reform in Philadelphia. Drawing on an exten-
sive literature and a growing consensus within
the research and education reform community,
our premise is that civic capacity is critical to
improving education, particularly in cities with
signiﬁcant social and economic challenges.
While other studies have examined civic
capacity in a wide variety of urban contexts,
Philadelphia is an important case because of
its extensive privatization. In Philadelphia, the
application of market principles is widelys
12 Turnbull, B. (2006, May). Citi -
zen Mobilization and Com mu nity
Instit u tions: The Public Education
Net work’s Policy Initiatives. Wash -
ing ton, DC: Policy Studies
Associates.
13 Stone, C. N. (2003). Civic
Cooperation in El Paso. Case
Studies in Community
Partnerships No. 1. Providence,
RI: Annenberg Institute.
14 Annenberg Institute for School
Reform. (2006, March). Results +
Equity + Community: Smart
Systems. Annenberg Institute
Emerging Know ledge Forum.
St. Petersburg, FL. 
Civic Capacity in Action
While generating civic capacity is difficult, it is not impossible. In a number of
cities, the energies and resources of the civic community have been harnessed
to promote and sustain reform. For example:
Studies on Civic Capacity
This is not Research for Action’s first
examination of civic capacity as it con-
tributes to school reform. In a study of
the 1995-2000 reform era, RFA found
that business, non-profit, district, higher
education, labor and community leaders
in Philadelphia had multiple, often con-
flicting theories about how best to
improve the schools. Without a shared
understanding, the coalition in support of
the reform—and by extension the reform
itself—lacked resilience in the face of
political and  economic challenges.15 In
2005, RFA again reported on the status
of civic capacity, focusing on issues of
“contracting out” in an increasingly
privatized  education system. There, we
found that outsourcing usefully increased
the number of organizations involved with
Philadelphia’s schools through contracts,
but, at the same time, channeled the
groups’ interactions with the district
 narrowly around contractual agreements.
This particularly affected the ability of
small community and grassroots groups
to play their traditional roles as the
voices of equity in the city.16 
15 Christman, J. B. & Rhodes, A. (2002, June).
Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement:
Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia.
Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research in
Education.
16 Gold, E., Cucchiara, M., Simon, E., & Riffer, M.
(2005, September). Time to Engage? Civic
Participation in Philadelphia’s School Reform.
Philadelphia: Research for Action.
seen as the solution to many urban woes,
including the persistent problems of limited
resources and low student achievement that
trouble the School District of Philadelphia.
Taken over by the state, implementing exten-
sive outsourcing of education services, and
embracing market models of reform, the
School District of Philadelphia is at the fore-
front of the national movement towards
increasing the involvement of the  private sec-
tor in public education.17 
In this report, we see promise in the activities
of the city, the district, nonproﬁt, university,
and business players for generating civic
capacity in Philadelphia. Others who have
looked at the state of civic life in Philadelphia
note that a fresh set of leaders appears to be
emerging, creating energy and hope where
there was defeatism in the past.18 We point out
that a wider variety of individuals, nonproﬁt
groups, and civic institutions are involved with
the School District than ever before, through
expanded contractual and partnership relation-
ships and the growth of charter schools. The
philanthropic community has supported the
activities of numerous civic, youth, and com-
munity-based groups concerned with educa-
tion issues, as well as research and its public
dissemination. Finally, an array of civic groups
is currently involved with the district (and in
education reform activity more generally),
which also helps lay the groundwork for more
comprehensive and coordinated mobilization.
At the same time, however, the new city and
district environment, in which market ideas
prevail as solutions to urban problems, pres-
ents unique challenges to the development of
civic capacity. 
RESEARCH for ACTION
4 Introduction  
17 Christman, J. B., Gold, E., & Herold, B. B.
(2006, June 2). Privatization “Philly Style”: What
Can Be Learned from Philadelphia’s Diverse
Provider Model of School Management (Updated
edition with important new information and find-
ings). Philadelphia: Research for Action; Gold, E.,
Christman, J. B., & Herold, B. B. (2007, February
1). Blurring the Boundaries: A Case Study of Private
Sector Involvement in Philadelphia Public Schools.
American Journal of Education, 113(2), 181-212.
18 Whiting, B. J. & Proscio, T. (2007, February).
Philadelphia 2007: Prospects and Challenges.
Brooklyn, NY: The Pew Charitable Trusts.  
The chapters that follow identify several inter-
related processes that currently impede civic
capacity and thus make deep, equitable, and
sustainable education reform a considerable
challenge: 
1 The city’s struggle to ﬁnd an economic
niche in the global economy has prioritized
the development of some neighborhoods
at the expense of others. In courting the
middle class, perceived as vital to the future
of the city, business and other leaders have
exacerbated existing tensions between the
goals of equity and economic growth.
Rather than perceiving a link between equi-
ty and growth, policy makers seem to
regard the two as zero sum choices. The
resulting divisiveness and emphasis on
group self-interest make the building of
civic capacity extremely difﬁcult. 
2 The School District of Philadelphia’s style
of top-down decision making, paired with
the SRC’s aforementioned closed-door
 policies, limits the potential for collabora-
tion. Lacking information about district
decisions or even basic facts and ﬁgures,
civic and community groups have difﬁculty
working together, engaging with the district,
or developing a shared sense of purpose—
all activities that are essential to creating
civic capacity. The need for “public
accountability”19 is especially critical in
a privatizing system—information, decision
making, and performance accountability can
become embedded in the contractual agree-
ments (or memoranda of understanding) that
form the basis for public-private relation-
ships, and thus hidden from public view.
3 While new contracts and partnerships have
brought many new outside players into the
district, these relationships tend to be struc-
tured hierarchically, e.g., district-to-vendor
or district-to-partner which discourages the
formation of the multi-sectoral, cross-group
collaboration important to civic capacity.
Similarly, the dominance of market ideas in
civic revitalization efforts positions
Philadelphians as individual  consumers
rather than as members of a broader com-
munity concerned with the good of all.
4 Increased activity around education issues
in the city is not sufﬁcient to meet the barri-
ers to civic capacity. Groups tend to work
for constituency or group interests; groups
and individuals focused on education
reform are rarely at the same table as those
who think about the future of the city; and
groups that offer social capital, or resources,
are advantaged in their relations with the
district over groups representing low-
income constituencies. 
These considerable impediments to civic
capacity call for explicit and strong interven-
tions. Unless these hurdles are addressed,
Philadelphia will not be able to build the
civic capacity necessary to create and
sustain genuine education change.
Building Civic Capacity 
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19 Gold, E. & Simon, E. (2004, January 14). Public
Accountability. Education Week, 23(18). 
The new city and district environ-
ment, in which market ideas prevail 
as  solutions to urban problems, 
presents unique  challenges to the
development of civic capacity.
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Organization of the Report
In the chapter that follows this introduction,
we show that Philadelphia’s civic and business
leaders have been greatly inﬂuenced by nation-
al trends towards market-oriented  policies as
a solution to urban problems. This analysis of
the larger city context serves as a backdrop to
Chapter Two of the report, which focuses on
the School District of Philadelphia, and shows
how the state takeover and the accompanying
acceleration of privatization have shaped the
district’s structures and practices. In Chapter
Three, we present case studies of four different
civic, business, and community groups and
examine their involvement in education reform
and the implications for the development of
civic capacity. The conclusion recommends
explicit interventions that can build on current
activity in Philadelphia to nurture civic
 capacity and support reform. 
We are writing this report at a critical
moment: leadership in both the city and the
district are in transition, while the School
District’s  current crisis has stimulated public
awareness and activism. Moments like these—
of crisis and transition—can provide openings
for shifts in direction. This is an ideal time to
examine the ways Philadelphians are involved
in education, evaluate how effectively the
schools serve their constituents, and develop
and implement strategies that will lead to
real and enduring change.
Questions Guiding this Study
The research presented here is a part of a
larger study, Learning from Philadelphia’s
School Reform, led by Research for Action,
which has followed school reform in
Philadelphia since the 2001 state takeover
of the School District of Philadelphia. Other
strands of the study have addressed gover-
nance, school-level changes, and student
achievement. This report draws primarily
from the civic engagement strand of
the study, but is also informed by RFA’s
findings and publications in the other areas.
The research for this report began in fall
2003 and was complete by early spring
2007. For a detailed description of the
methods used in this study, see the
Appendix. 
In order to assess the state takeover
and its consequences for civic capacity
for school reform in Philadelphia, we
designed a multi-part research strategy
to answer the following broad ques-
tions:
1 During the period 2002-07, what was
the social, political and economic con-
text for school reform in Philadelphia?
How did local civic actors approach
issues of urban development and what
were the implications for civic capacity?
2 In that same period, which included state
takeover of the School District of
Philadel phia and the acceleration of pri-
vatization, to what extent did the School
District’s organizational structure and
practices for interacting with the public
promote or impede the development of
civic capacity?
3 How did differently positioned groups
interested in education work to achieve
their goals within the city’s and the dis-
trict’s organizational structures and prac-
tices for public interaction? What does
the work of these groups show about the
promises and impediments to building
civic capacity?
4 Overall, what were the opportunities for
civic capacity for school reform? What
were the challenges to civic capacity? 
Philadelphia today is a city of paradoxes.
Named “America’s Next Great City” and tout-
ed for its restaurants, nightlife, and colorful
neighborhoods in the October 2005 issue of
National Geographic Traveler,20 Philadelphia
also has a dismal 25% poverty rate, the high-
est among the largest American cities.21
According to a 2007 study of the city’s eco-
nomic and civic prospects commissioned by
The Pew Charitable Trusts, Philadelphia is “in
better shape” than it was in the 1990s and
leaders within the city, departing from past
downbeat sentiments, express optimism about
the city’s future.22 At the same time, other
studies point to a continued decline—in over-
all population, jobs, corporate headquarters,
and wealth23— while high levels of
crime, particularly gun violence, contin-
ue to plague Philadelphia’s neighbor-
hoods. So the city teeters between heady
promises of revitalization on one side
and the tough challenges of poverty, vio-
lence, and decline on the other. 
Any discussion of school reform in
Philadelphia must contend with these
paradoxical extremes. In this chapter, we
consider the complicated political, social
and economic factors that serve as a con-
text for school reform in Philadelphia.
In interviews with local civic and com-
munity actors, we will show that market
models have come to dominate local thinking
about the city’s future, a focus that, we argue,
is often at variance with on-going efforts
towards  equity, both economic and education-
al. We will examine particularly the impact
market approaches have on low-income popu-
lations and communities, and, in the chapter’s
conclusion, discuss the implication of current
trends for creating the civic capacity essential
to  education reform, a topic we will continue
to explore in the chapters that follow. 
Market Strategies for Urban
Development and School Reform
Philadelphia’s extremes may be startling, but
the pattern is hardly unique among contempo-
rary American cities. Like many cities that
ﬂourished in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century,
Philadelphia, its once strong manufacturing
base eroded, has been struggling to ﬁnd its
place in the new economic landscape.24 Unable
to compete with ﬁnancial centers such as New
York, London, or Tokyo, “second tier” cities
like Philadelphia must ﬁnd other economic
bases. The latest popular formulae for civic re-
invention and revival call for cities to re-create
themselves as “markets of choice”25 for high-
tech, medical, and ﬁnancial knowledge-based
industries. 
In order to grow and retain knowledge-based
industries, these market-oriented theories
Cities are being
called to re-create
themselves as
"markets of choice"
for high-tech, 
medical, and
financial 
knowledge-based
industries. 
20 http://www.nationalgeographic.com/traveler/fea-
tures/philly0510/philly.html.
21 Philadelphia Workforce Investment Board (2007).
A Tale of Two Cities. Philadelphia: Philadelphia
Workforce Investment Board. 
22 Whiting, B. J. & Proscio, T., 2007.
23 Philadelphia Workforce Investment Board, 2007;
Fox, R. K., Treuhaft, S., & Douglass, R. (2005).
Shared Prosperity, Stronger Regions: An Agenda for
Rebuilding America’s Older Core Cities. Oakland,
CA: Policy Link; Brooking Institution Center on
Urban and Metropolitan Policy (2002). Back to
Prosperity: A Competitive Agenda for Renewing
Pennsylvania. Washington, D.C.: Author.
24 Hodos, J. I. (2002). Globalization, Regionalism,
and Urban Restructuring: The Case of Philadelphia.
Urban Affairs Review, 37(3), 358-379; Sassen, S.
(1994). Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
25 Brooking Institution Center on Urban and Metro -
politan Policy, 2002 ; Florida, R. (2005). The Flight
of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition
for Talent. New York: Harper Business.; Gogan, P. S.
& Proscio, T. (2000). Comeback Cities: A Blueprint
for Urban Neighborhood Revival. Boulder, Colo: West -
view Press.; Vey, J. S. (2007). Restoring Prosperity:
The State Role in Revitalizing America’s Older
Indus trial Cities. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution Metropolitan Policy Program; Whiting, B.
J. & Proscio, T., 2007.
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claim cities must attract “knowledge workers”
by catering to their preferences for a stimulat-
ing urban atmosphere and amenities.26 In
order to attract the businesses and amenities
these highly educated workers desire, govern-
ment itself must become more efﬁcient (by
downsizing, streamlining services, and mini-
mizing regulations) and more customer-
focused in the services it provides. Adherents
strive to solve city problems with “break-the-
mold policies in the privatization of city
 services, education and economic develop-
ment, as well as public safety.”27
Market approaches to urban revitalization are
rooted in distinct assumptions about the roles
of government and citizens that, while rarely
explicit, are important to understand.
According to this paradigm, government’s
role is to assure the unfettered operation of the
market. That premise translates into tax and
regulatory policies favorable to business and
private investment, and targets for investment
8 Chapter 1
In Philadelphia, privatization is a politically
charged issue. The 2001 state takeover of
the School District brought Philadelphia pri-
vatization on a grand scale.28 Six years later,
just as the district announced its budget
deficit, private-sector management contracts
for 41 low performing Philadelphia schools
came up for renewal. Three separate stud-
ies29 that examined private management of
Phila delphia schools concluded that these
schools had not performed on average any
better (or worse) than other district
schools,30 despite the private providers’
receiving extra per-pupil funding.
Nevertheless, neither that evidence, nor the
severe budget shortfall, nor the strong 
objections of one of its members, dissuaded
the majority of SRC members from voting to 
continue the contracts.31 Many parents and
others expressed outrage that the SRC 
continued to invest in these private 
managers despite evidence to suggest that
the “private management experiment” was
not working. They also believed that these
investments were being made at the expense
of district-wide reforms, such as keeping
classroom size reduced in the early grades,
maintaining music and art programs, and
growing the number of counselors in the high
schools, that would improve schools for all
children.32 In spring 2007, the SRC also
approved the continuation of 13 charter
schools.33 Even though two charter schools
did not meet established performance stan-
dards, their contracts were renewed on the
condition that they improve academically
and hire more certified teachers.34
26 Florida, R., 2005; Pennsylvania Economy League
of Greater Philadelphia (2003). No Brain—No Gain:
Town/Gown Relations and the Competition for
Talent. Greater Philadelphia Regional Review. 27 Gogan, P. S. & Proscio, T., 2000.
28 Christman, J. B., Gold, E., & Herold, B. B. 2006. 
29 Gill, B. P., Zimmer, R., Christman, J. B., & Blanc, S.
(2007, January). State Takeover, School Restructuring,
Private Management, and Student Achievement in Phila -
delphia. Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation; Accountability
Review Council (2007, February). The Status of 2005-
2006 Academic Performance in the School District of
Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Accountability Review
Council; School District of Philadelphia (2007). Draft
OAAI Report: Findings and Recommendations on EMO’s.
Philadelphia: School District of Philadelphia, The Office
of Accountability, Assessment, and Intervention.
30 There is one dissenting report that contests these
 findings. See Peterson, P. E. & Chingos, M. M. (2007,
October). Impact of For-Profit and Non-Profit Manage-
ment on Student Achievement: The Philadelphia
Experiment. Cambridge, MA: Program on Education Policy
and Governance.
31 The SRC renewed contracts for only 38 of the
schools as 3 closed in fall 2007. The contracts were
renewed for only 1 year for a flat per pupil expenditure
of $500 (Woodall, 6/27/07). 
32 Dean, M. & Russ, V., 2007, May 30; Snyder, S.,
2007, May 30. 
33 Despite renewing existing charters, the SRC deferred
decisions on any new charters due to budget constraints
(Snyder, 10/25/07). 
34 Woodall, M. (2007, April 19). 13 Charter Schools
Get Extensions. [Electronic Version] Philadelphia
Inquirer.
those areas most likely to become economic
centers and attract additional investment.
In a market-oriented environment, a citizen’s
role is that of consumer, acting for one’s own
individual well-being, and taking advantage
of opportunities afforded by a thriving
 marketplace. 
In education, the market approach favors
choice as the instrument for school improve-
ment. According to market theory, when par-
ents, as consumers, choose the schools their
children attend, they stimulate a competitive
environment that puts pressure on schools to
improve their quality. As consumers, parents
have the responsibility to make good choices
and to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction
by staying or leaving a
school or district. At ﬁrst,
market-oriented education
policy strategists touted
vouchers as the ideal instru-
ment for giving parents edu-
cational options. But, with
only a few exceptions
nationally, vouchers proved
too difﬁcult to achieve politi-
cally, and proponents now
advocate privatization as the
means to school choice.
Charter schools, private
management contracts, and
 special interest schools
formed in partnership with
private institutions are vari-
ous paths to increased choice
that fall under the broad
 deﬁnition of privatization.
Market Approaches—Philadelphia Style
In talking about the future of the city and how
education ﬁts in, most of the business, com-
munity, and nonproﬁt leaders we interviewed
believed that revitalization depended on posi-
tioning the city as a market of choice and saw
schools as an important tool in that effort. Our
respondents expressed these ideas in a variety
of ways, reﬂecting differences in how they
grappled with issues of equity and the poten-
tial of market solutions. When it comes to con-
fronting the realities of our urban environ-
ment, and, in particular, reconciling the
extremes of wealth and poverty, we found few
who subscribed purely either to a social wel-
fare or to a market approach. Those convinced
of the market approach’s logic had community
beneﬁt in mind.  Market skeptics, while they
questioned the belief that citizens’ consump-
tion in an unfettered market will lead to quali-
ty and equity, recognized the need for
Philadelphia’s economy and population to
grow.  Despite the diversity in how our inter-
viewees thought about markets and the role of
the government, there was near consensus that
schools could play an important role in retain-
ing and drawing new businesses and residents
to the city.  The majority of those we inter-
viewed, particularly business and economic
development leaders, expressed conﬁdence in
a market approach for revitalizing the city and
improving education. 
To a large extent, our respondents expressed
the belief that cities can position themselves to
be competitive by attracting a “desirable” pop-
ulation. Where they differed was in their inter-
pretations of whom this desirable population
would be. More than half of the people we
talked to deﬁned those desirables as residents
with economic resources, who will occupy the
technical and professional jobs that the city
hopes to attract. The city must strive “to retain
knowledge workers, retain the vitality of what
is the engine for the region’s growth, which is
Center City, Philadelphia,” said a respondent
from a leading civic group (General Inﬂuential
– Business,35 June 2005).
The goal of attracting and retaining these
“knowledge workers” has shaped the agenda
Building Civic Capacity 
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35 This category is one of the categories developed
by Stone et al. in their 2001 multi-site study of
civic capacity. We used the Stone et al. categories
to select our interviewees, making sure we had a
number of representatives from each of the sectors
they identified as critical to civic capacity. These
categories are: General Influentials, Education
Program Specialists and Community-
Based/Advocacy Leaders. 
Market skeptics 
promoted the citizens’
role in defining stan-
dards by which all
services, including
education, should be
provided. Citizens 
must monitor the 
delivery of services
and ensure that public
institutions provide
them effectively and
equitably. 
of various business leaders, nonproﬁt civic
groups—such as the Chamber of Commerce,
the Center City District,36 The Reinvestment
Fund, and the Pennsylvania Economy League
—as well as the city itself. Early in his ﬁrst
term, Mayor John Street formed the Knowledge
Industry Partnership (with Judith Rodin, the
president of the University of Pennsylvania, as
its ﬁrst chair), designed to entice graduates of
the city’s many colleges and universities to
stay in Philadelphia. Similarly, the mayor’s
high-proﬁle initiative to create an open, wire-
less communication network, while its goals
included reducing the digital divide, also
aimed to lure young, tech-savvy professionals
to a hip, high-tech town. 
Other respondents, however, focused on
attracting or keeping middle class residents in
the city, though not necessarily in Center City.
These informants deﬁned “middle class” not
speciﬁcally as a new class of “knowledge
workers” but as “working” or “young” 
families, and viewed their presence as an
important means of creating or restoring eco-
nomic diversity to Philadelphia neighborhoods
in need of revitalization. In the words of one
interviewee, who leads an advocacy organiza-
tion that works for equity causes: 
Oh, I don’t think there’s any doubt
that Philadelphia needs to retain
middle class people. If [there’s] any-
thing [that] the ’70s and ’80s have
shown, [it] is that economic isolation
is deadly for any kind of community
(Community-Based/Advocacy, July
2005) 
Community advocates see middle class fami-
lies as a source of both economic stability and
vitality to the city’s neighborhoods. A city
council representative we interviewed, for
example, expressed concern about retaining
“working families” in her district who would
be home owners and, hence, feel a greater
investment in the neighborhood (General
Inﬂuential – City Government, July 2006). 
Many of our respondents, echoing the national
discourse, discussed creating “markets of
choice”—areas that potential businesses and
residents would ﬁnd attractive and feel conﬁ-
dent about investing in—as a way of attracting
and retaining middle-class residents. We also
heard from those who, while acknowledging
the beneﬁts of a lively market and large 
middle class, worried about losing a sense of
shared community purpose. To counter the
inequities that might result from relying too
much on a market approach to urban renewal,
these leaders advocated for stronger involve-
ment of citizens, including those from low-
income neighborhoods not targeted as sites 
for investment, in helping to set city and
school agendas. 
The Schools and the City’s Future: 
Market Perspectives
In expressing concern about the role schools
play in attracting or discouraging middle-class
families from living in the city, Philadelphia
civic actors are not alone. As the authors of
Comeback Cities proclaim, urban public
schools should get on board with the market-
oriented movement that has caught on in other
realms of urban revitalization. They note, “In
some ways, the new battle over schools is the
ﬁnal frontier of inner city revitalization. All
the other incipient positive trends will fall
short of their potential if city schools continue
to push huge numbers of working- and mid-
dle-class families out of the city…If that
dreadful ‘push factor’ can be neutralized in
time by some combination of charter schools
and privatization—force sufﬁcient to drive
genuine reform within public schools as
well—the ultimate victory might be in the
cities’ grasp.”37
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36 Philadelphia’s downtown is referred to locally as
Center City.
No matter where our interviewees stood in
terms of their beliefs about government and
markets, there was  general agreement about
the relationship between schools and the city’s
future. Like the authors of Comeback Cities,
most of our informants wanted schools to slow
the drain of middle class, educated residents
and, ideally, make the city more attractive to 
middle-class families. Examples from our
interviews abound: 
I think that the city is dying off as an
economic center. And I think a lot of
the reason it is dying off is that peo-
ple won’t live here, and they won’t
live here because they don’t like the
public school system. So we don’t
have very many families with young
children (Education Program
Specialist – School District of
Philadelphia, Sept. 2004).
I see the development of the city and
schools as being interrelated...in
that, if people are to remain in the
city, if we are to attract young people
and that they’re going to contribute
to our city economy, then we have to
upgrade and improve our educational
institutions, elementary, secondary,
post secondary (Education Program
Specialist – General, June 2006). 
…key to this whole [revitalization
process] is offering people that are
moving back into the community
choice in education. And that comes
in the form of schools under private
management, some of the public
schools, private schools, or charter
schools (Community-Based/Advocacy,
July 2006). 
Thus, Philadelphians from different sectors
viewed schools as a critical factor in the city’s
ability to compete for more afﬂuent residents.
Proponents argue that the middle class expects
to have choices and will continue its exodus to
the suburbs in the absence of a host of appeal-
ing educational options. Indeed, as we will
discuss in Chapter Three, a powerful local
organization has put this reasoning into action,
partnering with the School District on an ini-
tiative designed to reverse middle-class ﬂight
by providing enhanced school choice for
Center City families. 
Alternatives to the Market: Aren’t We in
this Boat Together? 
Even though market thinking is widespread
among those we interviewed, there was a
small group of Philadelphia civic and commu-
nity leaders whose vision for the city and its
schools is based on a different set of assump-
tions. Those who articulated this alternative
vision believe that government—no matter
how it is conﬁgured—has a key role to play in
assuring equity, and that citizen participation
(which should mean more than acting as a
consumer in the educational marketplace) is
necessary to school improvement. Such indi-
viduals were most likely to be afﬁliated with
nonproﬁt advocacy, community-based and
organizing groups who represent low-income,
minority, and immigrant constituencies. 
Their perspective, which could be termed a
“social welfare” approach, contrasts with the
market thinking described earlier. The social
welfare point of view regards parents and citi-
zens not as individual consumers but as part of
a broad collective with shared interests and a
sense of mutual responsibility. As an informant
from a nonproﬁt advocacy group said:
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“I see the development of the city and
schools as being interrelated...if people
are to remain in the city, if we are to
attract young people who will contribute
to our city economy, then we have to
upgrade and improve our educational
institutions...” 
—Education Program Specialist June 2006
… if we were all in this boat togeth-
er, we’ll all have to invest more in it,
and it won’t be abandoned by those
people who have power…It is good
that they are trying to think of ways
to spruce up and strengthen whatev-
er educational opportunities are
available. We need to do that every
place… [but] saying, “Hey, I want to
make sure that my kid gets into the
right place,” that’s not my vision of
how people come to recognize we’re
all in the same boat together
(Community Based/Advocacy,
July 2005). 
While encouraged that more people are getting
involved in the school system and demanding
more from the district as a result of more edu-
cational options, this respondent was critical
of the ways the market model of education
promotes individualistic behavior. Instead, he
would like to see parents’ energies and activi-
ties channeled to beneﬁt all students, not just
their own.
Those with a social welfare perspective also
put a priority on equity as the driver of both
school and city improvement efforts. While
they acknowledge the “buzz” that Philadel -
phia’s Center City boom has created, they
are skeptical about whether the beneﬁts of
downtown development will eventually reach
Philadelphia’s low-income neighborhoods.
They argue that residents of the “neighbor-
hoods” (as opposed to the afﬂuent Center City
area) need to be involved in helping craft an
urban agenda that would distribute resources
more equitably citywide. Rather than focusing
on attracting the middle class or knowledge
workers to revitalize Philadelphia, these
 advocates stressed neighborhood-based
 economic development and job creation
along with human capital development as
the most important elements in a strategy
for Philadelphia’s future. 
Proponents of the social welfare approach
believe their voices—and that of low-income
communities in general—are not being heard
by the more powerful decision makers com-
mitted to market-based theories. One nonproﬁt
leader argued that because low-income resi-
dents were not making decisions about the
direction of the city, they were not beneﬁting
from city development policy. When asked to
characterize the disagreements about how to
improve the city, he asserted that the problems
come down to:
… racial politics, the class divide,
who’s making the decisions, and
upper middle-class mentality in
 government. …And if anything, it’s
going to obviously keep pushing poor
people to the edges…. So it’s either
a strategy to rid the city of poor peo-
ple, and that supports bringing in a
middle-class, but then you also have
to create a system that is accommo-
dating to that middle-class mentality,
and that middle-class lifestyle. So
who gets sacrificed? Poor people.
The working class. (Community
Based/ Advocacy, May 2006).
This respondent was one of the few to express
direct criticism of the prevailing focus on
attracting the middle class. In contrast to other
interviewees, who believed the city as a whole
would beneﬁt from an increased middle-class
presence, he argued that the poor would be
marginalized, literally “pushed out.” 
Schools and the City’s Future: 
Social Welfare Perspectives
Whereas proponents of market-oriented devel-
opment emphasized the “trickle down” bene-
ﬁts of revitalization, adherents to the social
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Advocates for low-income communities
stressed neighborhood-based  economic 
development and job creation and training 
as the most important elements in a strategy
for Philadelphia’s future.
welfare discourse present “bottom up” strate-
gies as more equitable and sustainable. As a
result, they had a different vision of the role
schools should play in the city’s trajectory.
The director of a nonproﬁt advocacy organiza-
tion made clear this point of view through his
focus on the importance of neighborhood
development, with good schools a key factor
in strengthening neighborhoods. School
reform, in the minds of community leaders
like this one, is crucial: education is the best
means for developing “human capital,” while
good local schools bring strength and stability
to their neighborhoods. He called for more
integration between city and School District
efforts regarding neighborhood improvement,
suggesting that groups interested in improving
education should ask, 
What would make it a good school
for the people in this neighborhood
and what would tie into other things
that are happening in this neighbor-
hood? I don’t think that’s happened
at the city level. I don’t think that’s
happened at the district level … I
think they [the city and the School
District] should be about neighbor-
hood building … and I think they
ought to be able to talk to each
other. And I don’t get the feeling
that’s happened at all. (Community
Based/Advocacy, March 2006)
This respondent believed schools have a criti-
cal role to play in Philadelphia’s future, as do
the proponents of market models. His focus
was much more on using schools to build
assets in neighborhoods that had not been tar-
geted by other revitalization efforts.
Those calling for more bottom-up approaches
did not necessarily think that the pre-takeover
public school system had been signiﬁcantly
more open to community participation. But
they also did not feel that the School District’s
current market orientation was providing
opportunities for the sort of broad and compre-
hensive citizen participation they deemed
important. To these respondents, market mod-
els were useful in some ways because they
offered strategies for retaining middle income
families and therefore the potential for greater
economic integration in many neighborhoods.
Indeed, many interviewees drew upon both
market and social welfare discourses, but they
were also convinced that a market approach
alone could not guarantee an equitable distri-
bution of education resources. Instead, only
public entities (such as the School District)
guided by and responsive to all community
members, could provide that sort of guarantee. 
Conclusion
In this section of the report, we have argued
that Philadelphia’s leaders have been greatly
inﬂuenced by market-oriented national trends
and policies designed to address urban prob-
lems. The solutions proposed for improving
Philadelphia schools parallel the solutions that
business and other leaders in the city support
for assuring the city’s future: The idea of creat-
ing markets in areas of the city with  potential to
attract people and businesses is echoed in a
call for choice as the basic  principle behind
school reform. As we show here, proponents
of school choice in Philadel phia often speak of
it as a means of making the city more attrac-
tive to middle-class families. Others, less
focused on urban revitalization, see school
choice as a means for individual upward
mobility. At the same time, though, the market-
approach to education has its detractors; a
number of our respondents expressed serious
concern about the ways that choice, market
models, and efforts to attract the middle class
to the city and its schools will affect low-
income communities. 
As stated in our introduction, this report
is concerned above all with civic capacity.
Recognizing that “fundamental reform in
 education also requires a depth of community
engagement far greater than is the case with
most policy areas,”38 we consider how the 
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current trend towards market-oriented thinking
and the resulting tensions that have emerged
affect the development of civic capacity for
school reform in the city. 
Certainly, Philadelphia’s resurgence provides
reason for optimism. Indeed, there is a new
sense of energy in the city, and the inﬂux of
afﬂuent residents bolsters the local economy
and tax base. There is a new group of young
leaders in Philadelphia who may be able to
work with, rather than parallel to, the next
mayoral administration, and capitalize on the
opportunities a revitalized city creates.
However, as we have noted, the civic capacity
that will engender meaningful reform to the
city’s schools requires solutions devised by a
broad coalition of groups, including both elites
and non-elites. Though our research docu-
ments general agreement about market solu-
tions among the city’s leadership, we also
found that among key constituencies, particu-
larly groups representing low-income commu-
nities, skepticism about market solutions
remains (although the Philadelphia Black
Alliance for Educational Options [BAEO]
which we will discuss in Chapter Three,
serves as an important exception). The leaders
of these groups feel that they and their con-
stituents have been excluded from both the
city’s and the School District’s decision-
making processes, and they expressed signiﬁ-
cant distrust of city and School District policy
and priorities as a result. Until decision-mak-
ing processes and feelings of exclusion are
addressed, they will present barriers to
the effectiveness of the School
District—they perpetuate a divisive
city culture that lacks the breadth and
depth of relationships across race and
class necessary to move forward a
school reform agenda. 
As Philadelphia’s “resurgence” contin-
ues, the contrast between the more
afﬂuent areas, particularly in and
around Center City, and the struggling
“neighborhoods” could become even
starker. Those charged with leading
the city, the School District, and the city’s
civic and community groups, are all struggling
with how to balance two equally important
goals: economic growth and equity. At the
moment, it appears that national trends,
Philadelphia’s economic circumstances, and
the near disappearance of social welfare dis-
course as the means to solve the problems of
the city and the schools have led to the domi-
nance of a market approach, with investment
focused on already “revitalizing” areas. Thus,
the tension in the city between growth and
equity maps onto the city’s geography, with
different neighborhoods competing for
resources. This divisive dynamic represents a
further obstacle to civic capacity because it
prevents groups and communities from work-
ing together around a shared vision for the
greater good of all. 
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Those charged with 
leading the city, the
School District, and 
civic and community
groups are struggling to
balance two equally
important goals: economic
growth and equity.
At the moment, it appears that national trends,
Philadelphia’s economic circumstances, and the
near disappearance of social welfare discourse have
led to the dominance of a market approach, with
investment focused on already "revitalizing" areas.  
The previous chapter describes the ways in
which market approaches to urban develop-
ment and to education have become pervasive
in Philadelphia. In education, the turn towards
market thinking among local civic and busi-
ness leaders can be traced to the 1990s, when,
frustrated with the pace of district-led reforms,
they began to embrace charter schools and
vouchers as school-reform solutions. This
shift on the part of the business community
helped smooth the way for the 2001 state
takeover and the establishment of a new, busi-
ness-oriented School District administration.39
In turn, the state takeover of the School
District of Philadelphia and the sub-
sequent market-based reforms
brought the city’s school system in
line with the now general shift
towards market approaches as the
remedy to urban problems.
Implemented during the same peri-
od, the federal No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) legislation—
which offered various forms of
 privatization as solutions for persist-
ent school failure—lent further
credibility to this shift. NCLB’s
strict accountability requirements
also boosted the new district leader-
ship’s authority and gave additional
urgency to its focus on perform-
ance-based  accountability measures. 
With the state takeover, the district restruc-
tured itself around a business management
model, privatizing core educational functions
and deﬁning interactions with the public in the
language of the marketplace, with constituents
becoming “consumers,” “vendors,” and/or
“audiences.” In this chapter, we describe the
ways in which the adoption of business prac-
tices and privatization have shaped the dis-
trict’s approaches and the impediments this
creates for civic capacity. Speciﬁcally, we
argue that the managerial, top-down style of
leadership, opaque decision-making processes,
and increased centralization have constrained
the public’s role in contributing to key deci-
sions. In addition, the district has deﬁned its
engagement with the public in narrow terms,
further inhibiting opportunities for interaction,
debate, and co-construction of policy, all
essential to the development of civic capacity.40
Interviews with SRC members and central
ofﬁce staff, as well as our own observations
of SRC meetings, reveal the extent to which
market-oriented practices have come to char-
acterize the district during this reform period.
(See the Appendix, Chart B for a description
of interviewees and observations.) Although
arguably these practices have resulted in
increased district attention to the needs of
 individual families, and opened the district to
deeper and greater involvement with both the
not-for-proﬁt and for-proﬁt sectors, we argue
that, overall, these market practices have also
led to new and unique obstacles to civic
capacity and, thus, to comprehensive and
 lasting reform. 
First, we show that decision making has
become the domain of a few, as well as a
 private, not public affair. The resulting lack of
district transparency has meant a loss of public
accountability for the policies and practices of
the district. And in a privatized environment,
such as we have in Philadelphia, such public
accountability is crucial; the public acts as an
important check to ensure that contractual
relationships between the district and vendors
are meeting standards of efﬁciency, effective-
ness, and equity.41 As we noted in the 
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The state takeover
and the subse-
quent market-
based reforms
brought the city’s
school system in
line with the shift
towards market
approaches to
solving urban
problems.  
39 Boyd, W. L. & Christman, J. B. (2002). A Tall
Order for Philadelphia’s New Approach to School
Governance: Heal the Political Rifts, Close the
Budget Gap, AND Improve the Schools. In L. Cuban
& M. Usdan (Eds.), Powerful Reforms with Shallow
Roots: Improving America’s Urban Schools (96-
124). New York: Teachers College Press; Christman,
J. B. & Rhodes, A., 2002. 
40 Ostrum, E. (1996) Crossing the Great Divide:
Coproduction, Synergy, and Development. World
Development, 24(6), 1073-1087.
41 Minow, M. (2003, January 30). Public and
Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion. Harvard Law Review, 116(1), 1229-1273.
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introduction to this report, both transparency
and public accountability are essential to creat-
ing a climate in which civic capacity can
thrive. Second, we show that the district’s
modes of interaction with the public have been
constructed around a hierarchical model—dis-
trict-to-consumer, district-to-vendor, and dis-
trict-to-audience—that impedes the develop-
ment of a collective awareness. Such hierar-
chies tend to isolate individuals and groups
according to special interests and categories,
inhibiting the kind of cross-group collaboration
that leads to, and supports, ongoing reform. 
Restructuring the District around a
Business Model and Privatization
The architects of the takeover (namely,
Governor Tom Ridge and later Governor Mark
Schweiker along with other key state ofﬁcials)
were strong supporters of market-oriented
reforms, and their choices for the district’s
new leadership reﬂected this orientation. The
governor selected a businessman from the sub-
urbs to chair the new Commission, and his
other two appointees came with extensive
management experience in the for-proﬁt and
nonproﬁt sectors. Under this leadership the
district adopted a number of practices speciﬁc
to the business world: centralizing decision
making to enhance efﬁciency, replacing the
superintendent with a CEO, outsourcing a
range of services and core educational func-
tions to private providers,42 and emphasizing
performance accountability measures for
schools and teachers. 
The School District of Philadelphia is not
alone in turning to business for leadership,
rhetoric, and practices.43 New York, Chicago,
and a number of other large urban districts
have also been heavily inﬂuenced by corporate
management styles and market-based theories.
Philadelphia, however, has become the
nation’s largest experiment in educational pri-
vatization. Though the SRC did not adopt the
state’s original proposal for privatization lock,
stock, and barrel (which would have contract-
ed out 60 low-performing schools and many
central ofﬁce functions to one vendor, Edison
Schools, Inc.), it did adopt an extensive priva-
tization scheme, known as the “diverse-
provider model” of school management. As
we explained in Chapter One, 45 low-perform-
ing schools were turned over to seven for-
proﬁt and nonproﬁt managers.44 The SRC also
made clear that it was open to charter schools,
a topic we will discuss below. 
The new regime used the district’s ongoing
funding shortages as further justiﬁcation of the
business paradigm they were adopting. District
administrators, pushed to think “outside the
box” to address the district’s 2001 ﬁscal crisis,
sought new, untapped sources of human and
ﬁnancial capital.45 By creating new kinds of
relations with non-public actors, district ofﬁ-
cials hoped to appease state legislators critical
of the district (and supportive of privatization),
thereby repairing the historically fractious
relationship with the state and securing addi-
tional state funding.46
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43 Hancock, L. (2007, July 9). School’s Out. The
Nation, 285(2), 16-22; Shipps, D. (1997). The
Invisible Hand: Big Business and Chicago School
Reform. Teachers College Record, 99(1), 73-116.
44 For a full description of the diverse-provider
model, see, Christman, J. B., Gold, E., & Herold,
B., 2006.
45 Bulkley, K. E. (2007, February). Bringing the
Private into the Public: Changing the Rules of the
Game and New Regime Politics in Philadelphia
Public Education. Educational Policy, 21(1), 161.
46 In fact, with the appointment of the SRC and the
establishment of the diverse provider model, both
the city and state released additional funding for
the system. However, there was a structural deficit
which was not alleviated by the short term infusion
of funds (which also included the sale of district
property and a bond issue). District budgeting
processes gave the appearance that the problems
had been resolved, but in 2007 the district’s 
serious fiscal problems became a visible crisis.
Obstacles to Civic Capacity
The adoption of business practices has
shaped how the district interacts with
individuals and groups in a variety of
ways, essentially creating a new land-
scape for civic and community
involvement in education in
Philadelphia. In some respects this
new landscape allows the district to be
more responsive to individuals and
organizations interested in working
with the schools or needing to resolve
particular issues. At the same time,
however, key aspects of this landscape
make the sorts of activities that help
build civic capacity—such as dialogue
and collaboration in setting policy—
signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult.    
Behind Closed Doors
The SRC unveiled the diverse provider model
of school management in April 2002, assign-
ing private sector providers to low-performing
neighborhood elementary, middle, and K-8
schools with virtually no public discussion
about the criteria for matching providers with
speciﬁc schools. Similarly, when the contracts
with the providers were ﬁnally signed in
August 2002 there was no public scrutiny of
the standards to which the providers would be
held accountable.47 This scenario presaged a
style that was to characterize the SRC during
its ﬁrst ﬁve years. Time and again, the SRC
commissioners would discuss issues among
themselves behind closed doors, coming for-
ward only with their decisions. Rather than the
city and state appointees’ openly airing their
differences, the commission worked hard to
iron out disagreements in private, thus mini-
mizing the number of split votes on decisions
and the appearance of fractious politics.48
For similar reasons, the SRC also eschewed
public debate or oversight, strictly regulating
public speaking at its meetings.49 A top district
ofﬁcial acknowledged this tendency, observing
that “civic engagement and community
involvement” were generally regarded as
“softer, might be nice, but not essential.” The
SRC’s resistance to open dialogue, this ofﬁcial
believed, reﬂected an aversion to the
inevitable conﬂict that comes with public
involvement: 
We’re afraid to engage the public
because … it is painful sometimes to
hear people dissatisfied with what
you’re doing. So [commissioners]
don’t always want to do that, it is not
always at the top of the agenda to go
out and be hollered at…. [Also] it is
messier, … outside of our control ….
(Education Program Specialist –
School District of Phila., Nov. 2006).
With information scarce about how and why
decisions were made, the public was left in the
dark, and decision making within the district
became the domain of a select few.50
Centralized Decision Making
In line with a new business-inﬂuenced model,
the SRC hired Paul Vallas to be the district’s
Chief Executive Ofﬁcer. As the head of the
Chicago public schools, Vallas had developed
a reputation for a top-down managerial style
that  resonated with the SRC’s approach. With
a mandate to make dramatic change quickly,
Vallas immediately established his authority,
issuing a blizzard of reforms to be executed
right away and across the board. Like the
SRC, Vallas left little room for public input
into his decision-making processes and
 formulated sweeping new policies on disci-
pline, retention, and promotion without any
public involvement.51
Building Civic Capacity 
Chapter 2     17
The adoption of
 business practices
has shaped how
the district 
interacts with
individuals and
groups, creating a
new landscape for
civic and com-
munity involvement
in education. 
47 Christman, J. B., Gold, E., & Herold, B., 2006;
Useem, E., Christman, J. B., & Boyd, W. L., 2006.
48 Useem, E., Christman, J. B., & Boyd, W. L.,
2006. 
49 Gold, E. et al., 2005; Useem, E., Christman, J.
B., & Boyd, W. L., 2006.
50 Gold, E. et al., 2005; Useem, E., Christman, J.
B., & Boyd, W. L., 2006. 
51 Useem, E., Christman, J. B., & Boyd, W. L.,
2006.
RESEARCH for ACTION
18 Chapter 2       
Shortly after the School District of
Philadelphia’s new administration took power,
the federal government instituted NCLB,
which mandated that student achievement
gains be signiﬁcant and rapid. NCLB brought
a heightened sense of urgency to the already
intense situation generated by the district’s ﬁs-
cal predicament and the state takeover, and
further justiﬁed centralized decision making.
For example, even though the diverse provider
model had decentralizing potential, NCLB
gave Vallas license to declare that all schools,
regardless of management model, were district
schools and would be held to the same per-
formance standards.52 The pervasive sense of
crisis, exacerbated by NCLB, may also have
served to discourage a more open approach to
public engagement. Dialogue and collabora-
tion take time, a resource in short supply in a
culture of crisis and urgency.53 One ofﬁcial
described the choice between centralized and
decentralized decisions as a “balancing act”
leaders must perform: 
You can’t let a thousand flowers
bloom, I mean, and have every
 decision made at the community
level when you’re in charge of
 moving an institution, because you
have to balance the resources of
that institution (Education Program
Specialist – School District of
Philadelphia, August 2006). 
Pressured by NCLB, the state takeover, and
a strained budget, School District leadership
chose the efﬁciency of centralization over
more inclusive decision-making processes.
Contracting Out
In the years since the takeover and initial
 privatization of many schools, Vallas and the
SRC further developed a system of outsourc-
ing core educational functions, including
expanding the contracting out of school
management.54 Vallas tied his use of out -
sourcing to a broader pragmatism, an interest
in “what works, whether it’s private or non-
private.”55 The long list of district contractors
currently includes individual consultants, cor-
porations, small and minority businesses, uni-
versities, educational nonproﬁts, and dozens of
community groups that provide services and
personnel to the district in the areas of truancy
prevention, after-school programming, parent
relations, hospitality and customer relations,
and school and community safety.56
Under Vallas and the SRC, the district began
to rearrange its administrative structure to
facilitate the development of external relation-
ships, particularly with the private sector,
including for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt groups. The
number of individuals and organizations con-
tracting with the district has increased dramati-
cally in recent years, from 80 in 2002 (the
SRC’s ﬁrst year) to 183 in 2005, with the $500
million the district spent on contracts in 2005
representing a quarter of its operating budg-
et.57 In addition to outsourcing, the district has
increasingly looked for private sector “part-
ners” to assist in its reform efforts. In a depar-
ture from past reform eras, the Vallas adminis-
tration made the development of such partner-
ships a cornerstone of its reform strategy
(Education Program Specialists – School
54 Christman, J. B., Gold, E., & Herold, B. B., 2006;
Mezzacappa, D. (2006, Fall). CEP Mystery: Many Pass
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1, 13; Useem, E. & Rinko, K. (2006, Fall). Turning to Outside
Organizations to do More Jobs. Philadelphia Public School
Notebook. 18, 20.
55 Dean, M., 2002, December 20. 
56 Dean, M. (2006, September 21). Commission Approves
Funding for Parent Truant Officers. [Electronic version]. Phila -
delphia Daily News; Useem, E. & Rinko, K., (2006, Fall).
57 Useem, E. & Rinko, K., (2006, Fall). The number and
amount of contracts, however, appears to be decreasing
in 2007 in response to the most recent budget crisis.
52 Dean, M. (2002, December 20). A Year Later:
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Philadelphia Daily News.
53 Gold, E. et al., 2005. 
NCLB brought a heightened sense of urgency to the
already intense situation generated by the district’s
fiscal crisis and the state takeover. This further jus-
tified centralized decision making.
District of Philadelphia, Sept. 2004; August,
2006). “Partners” are organizations that work
with the district but, unlike contractors or ven-
dors, do not receive funds. They include some
of the city’s largest cultural organizations, area
universities, and many churches and faith-
based groups, as well a national corporate
partner, Microsoft, Inc. Like contractors, they
have a formal agreement with the district, a
“memorandum of understanding” of the serv-
ices they will provide, such as helping to cre-
ate new schools or developing particular pro-
grams for students. 
District leaders see both contracting
out and partnerships as a way to bring
in additional resources in the form of
human capital, funding, programs, and
materials—thereby helping the district
overcome its chronic lack of resources.
As a top ofﬁcial explained, 
[W]hen you get down to the core
of how we move urban education
forward, we have to have the
resources. And until and unless
someone is going to address the
issue of how education is fund-
ed… then school districts have
to be more creative in attracting
the resources to get their job
done…. But the public-private
partnership is really a mini solu-
tion to the bigger problem, which is
the funding of public education
(Education Program Specialist –
School District of Philadelphia,
August 2004).
The new administrative structure facilitates
external relationships, enabling, for example, a
local business organization to develop, imple-
ment, and assess a volunteer reading program.
Referring to the Ofﬁce of Development,58 a
business leader explained “with that ofﬁce in
place, there is one stop for us to go to, and
they give us multiple opportunities to interact”
(General Inﬂuential – Business, July 2006).
This business leader praised the new structure,
noting that it created a “streamlined” process
and provided greater accountability.
While the district has always worked with
local nonproﬁts and universities, its network
of relationships is now much larger and more
systematic than in the past. Reﬂecting on how
university partnerships have changed since the
takeover, one long-time district staffer
explained, “in my memory, we have never
done this kind of partnership with the higher
ed community” and described earlier district-
university projects as “small smatterings
where grad students come in and do some
stuff and undergrads volunteer to mentor and
tutor” in a way that was difﬁcult to monitor
and assess (Education Program Specialist—
School District of Philadelphia, Sept. 2004).
The current university partnerships, which
include administrative assistance, curriculum
enrichment, and professional development,
carry with them higher expectations and more
substantive consequences. In the words of the
same administrator: 
The School Reform Commission
wants to see statistical evidence of
what the planned outcomes are and
then at the end of that year they
want to see how close we came to
those outcomes…. We can no longer
float along as a district, not that we
ever meant to, but this is very, very
specific and structured. 
District ofﬁcials, particularly those at upper
levels, believe the focus on developing rela-
tionships with external organizations has made
the district far more “open” to outsiders than
before. In the words of one high-level ofﬁcial,
“everyone is at the door, and it is open”
(Education Program Specialist – School
District of Philadelphia, August 2004).
Another staff member agreed, noting that more
groups are involved in schools and now are
seeking contracts to provide services to the
district as a result of the contracting process
(Education Program Specialist – School District
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of Philadelphia, August 2006). In fact, one dis-
trict ofﬁcial spoke of community engagement
only in connection with the contracting process,
implying that the contracts community groups
received were the most visible vehicle through
which such groups engaged with the schools
(Education Program Specialist – School
District of Philadelphia, July 2006).       
While supporters of contracting out, who gen-
erally come from the ranks of top ofﬁcials,
believe that the practice has increased efﬁcien-
cy and brought needed resources and talent to
the district, others question the usefulness and
appropriateness of the practice. Critics within
the district, largely, but not entirely, mid-level
district staff, express concern that contracts
structure relationships in ways that interfere
with a community group’s ability to act inde-
pendently and hold the district accountable, a
concern echoed in the general literature on pri-
vatization as well as in our own work 59
(Education Program Specialists, July 2006;
August 2006). One top ofﬁcial observed that
the district expects organizations with con-
tracts to refrain from public criticism: 
I know we have been guilty of trying to
be heavy-handed with groups, because
now we give you a contract and …we
expect… you’re not going to be critical
of us anymore; you’re going to do this
or else you won’t get this contract. And
that’s wrong (Education Program
Specialist – School District of
Philadelphia, Nov. 2006). 
Another way contracting can stiﬂe genuine
conﬂict or criticism, this same ofﬁcial noted, is
that the district is much more likely to give
contracts to groups that have been supportive
of district policies, while “groups that have
been very critical of the district ﬁnd it very
difﬁcult to do business here.” In the words of
another district administrator: “So many of
these people live off the district; they’re
fueled, funded off the district. It is a dif-
ﬁcult place to be and be objective”
(Education Program Specialist – School
District of Philadel phia, February
2007). By constraining community par-
ticipation, the district’s practice of form-
ing contractual partnerships weakens
the environment for civic capacity. By
skewing power relations toward district-
to-contractor and district-to-partner
interactions, current School District pol-
icy makes genuine collaboration and
collective action more difﬁcult.
The district’s previously noted lack of
system transparency carries over into
and further complicates its contracting
strategy. An investigation into district
practices uncovered large numbers of
“no bid” contracts. Without a normal
competitive process, the community has
no knowledge of the criteria used to
choose and evaluate certain vendors.60
In fact, even for competitive contracts,
information about vendors and the terms of
their agreements is not readily available, with
one local journalist calling his efforts to attain
information about contracts a “summer-long
ordeal.”61 Since outsourcing is such an 
important part of the current reform effort,
civic actors—local leaders, community 
groups, youth, and parents—must be able to
stay informed about who is receiving con-
tracts, what they are supposed to be doing, 
and whether or not they are performing.
Without such information, it is difﬁcult for
these actors to work collaboratively with the
district in moving reform forward—and, on a
more basic level, it is impossible for them to
ensure that vendors are held accountable for
their performance. 
Since outsourcing
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Choice
The SRC has fully embraced charters and
school choice as part of its market approach to
school reform. During the ﬁve years of state
takeover, the number of charter schools in the
city has risen from 40 before the state takeover
(2001-2002) to 56 during the 2006-2007
school year. In spring 2007, in the midst of a
budget crisis, the district postponed granting
any new charters. Nonetheless, SRC chair
James Nevels continued to emphasize the dis-
trict’s commitment to the charter model, stat-
ing, “There has been a consistent support for
charters by the School Reform Commission…
They are an essential ingredient for school
choice, and we will continue to support them.”62
The district has also worked to expand educa-
tional options among district-run schools,
including developing smaller, themed high
schools to replace or reduce populations in
large neighborhood high schools. District lead-
ership has proposed a system of high school
choice within each region—including magnet
schools, schools offering specialized areas of
study and/or alternative schools, and charter
schools as options alongside the traditional
neighborhood high school. In theory, this
range of regional options lets students choose
a high school that would not entail traveling
across the city to one of the handful of magnet
schools currently available. 
In some ways, this offers parents a new vehi-
cle for involvement in the schools—as con-
sumers in the educational marketplace.
However, the focus on choice and charters
also serves as a barrier to the development of
civic capacity by channeling parents’ involve-
ment towards individual schools rather than
the district as a whole. Indeed, a parent inter-
viewed for our report expressed concern about
this tendency, noting that when she and a
group of parents from her child’s school met
with a member of the SRC to discuss the
budget crisis, the commissioner suggested that
the school, which has an active parent organi-
zation, simply become a charter to avoid the
district’s budget problem (Fieldnotes, August
2007). This suggestion is troubling because,
had they followed this advice, this group of
highly motivated, skilled parents would chan-
nel their efforts towards a single charter school
and no longer serve as advocates for the public
schools in general. 
Communicating
At the time of state takeover, the district was a
discredited public institution, marked by  ﬁscal
and academic crisis and political wrangling
between city and state. The SRC and CEO
Vallas, aware of the importance of creating
a positive public image to restore conﬁdence
and legitimacy to the system, placed a great
deal of emphasis on public relations—much
more so than previous administrations, accord-
ing to one long-time district insider (Education
Program Specialist, School District of Phila del-
phia, July 2006). In addition to its own com-
munications ofﬁce, the district hired a public
relations ﬁrm to help manage the public’s
 perception of Philadelphia’s schools and Paul
Vallas began meeting regularly with local
media. As one district ofﬁcial said of Vallas:
“He’s a total open book in terms of educating
the people who are communicating to the
communities every day about education”
(Education Program Specialist – School
District of Philadelphia, August 2006). The
 district also targeted city and state leaders,
whose support and resources were crucial, in
its communication campaign. “Keeping the
leaders informed and engaged is really impor-
tant because they can give you cover and they
give you room and they help provide resources
you wouldn’t normally get,” explained the
same district ofﬁcial. 
While the district’s concerted public relations
effort created the perception of openness and
accessibility, communication through media
channels actually precludes open and direct
public dialogue, presenting yet another obsta-
cle to civic capacity. The mode of communica-
tion favored by the School District positions
Philadelphians as “audience” rather than as
participants in reform; communication
62 Woodall, M., 2007, April 19. 
becomes a way of marketing the district and
managing public opinion rather than making
decisions transparent or working openly with
the public. Within this paradigm, district prob-
lems or failures are public relations challenges
to be held in check, rather than opportunities
for a broader public dialogue that could lead to
genuine solutions.
Customer Service
Viewing public education through the market
lens, the district has also focused attention on
satisfying individual customers, deﬁning its
approach to community and parent engage-
ment in terms of “customer service.” School
District leadership encourages administrators
and staff to view their primary mission as
 providing quality service to individual students
and their families. One administrator described
this as something of a paradigm shift. In
response to a question about outreach and
engagement, she explained:
I think that people within the district
are beginning [to see] that Paul [Vallas]
is really serious about [reaching out to
parents]. …There was a mentality that
was so deeply entrenched….I think it
was very much this kind of historic,
venerable, stylized, rigid environment
that says, “We are the district.” [Vallas
and Nevels say], “No, you’re not. You’re
not. Those kids are the district. Their
parents are the district.” Mr. Nevels
constantly has [said this] because he
is in the private sector. He’s like,
“They’re the customer.” He always
says, “It takes this amount of money
and time to get a customer, but you
can lose them in one second”
(Education Program Specialist – School
District of Philadelphia, August 2006).
As this administrator’s response makes clear,
for some district leaders a focus on customer
service has come to predominate ways of
thinking about working with the public
(Personal Communication, March 2007).
Consistent with this emphasis, the district has
developed a set of programs allowing staff to
respond more quickly to individual needs and
concerns: 
We’ve tried to improve our problem-
solving of individual family problems
with things such as the call center,
bully hotline, parent support hotline,
and things like that. We had this 24-
hour turnaround time to respond to
some of these things. We’re trying to
do better at that (Education Program
Specialist – School District of
Philadelphia, July 2006). 
With a strong customer service
orientation, the system can
respond more effectively to par-
ents’ speciﬁc needs and ques-
tions concerning their individ-
ual children. But the market
metaphor also renders uni-
dimensional what in reality is a
complex, multi-dimensional
 relationship. Many parents who
understand that their problems
are rooted in larger district
practices or policy, or who want
to be involved in decisions that
affect every student’s educa-
tion, want to be viewed as more
than “customers.” 
The resurgence of collective
parent activity around the budget deﬁcit in
spring 2007 demonstrates well that parents
care about the well-being of the community, as
well as that of the individual child. As a result
of parent pressure, the district held public
hearings to address the budget shortfall. One
district leader described the hearings as “nec-
essary and healthy,” while characterizing the
district’s responses as “kind of reactive to cri-
sis versus a proactive on-going systematic
way” of ensuring that Philadelphians are
involved with the schools (Education Program
Specialist – School District of Philadelphia,
Nov. 2006). 
This sort of reactive response is typical,
because the district, currently conﬁgured to
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respond to individual concerns, has developed
few mechanisms for working with more col-
lective mobilizations. As one district ofﬁcial
remarked:
In terms of getting folks to the table
and talking about policy, certainly
around issues related to curriculum
and the capital program as it relates
to new schools, I would say it has
been the communities [who have]
had to stand up and say, “We want
a voice here,” and that there hasn’t
been a pro-active organizing of
groups to give input (Education
Program Specialist – School District
of Philadelphia, July 2006). 
While engaging with groups may be challeng-
ing, the district’s reactive stance is problemat-
ic. It is only through ongoing collaborative
work with groups (such as organizations com-
prised of parents, youth and community mem-
bers) that the district will be able to contribute
to the building of civic capacity that is essen-
tial to lasting educational reform. 
Outreach and Involvement
Of course, not all of the district’s initiatives ﬁt
into the market-oriented categories we have
described here. In interviews, district ofﬁcials
pointed to a number of programs designed to
increase and enhance parent and community
involvement in schools. With respect to par-
ents, the Parent Leadership Academy (PLA)
and the Parent Assistance Desk were both
attributed to Vallas’ interest in “building par-
ents as partners” (Education Program Specialists
– School District of Philadelphia, July 2005;
July 2006; August 2006). Discussing communi-
ty involvement, ofﬁcials described an effort to
establish and formalize partnerships with local
faith organizations to bring volunteers into the
schools and develop additional programming
for students. District ofﬁcials note that such
partnerships would bring important supports
into the schools, such as tutors for the students,
at little or no cost to the district, since the or -
ganizations involved receive no district mo ney
(Education Program Specialist – School District
of Philadelphia, August 2006; Personal Com -
munication, March 2007). In these sorts of
activities, parents and community members
contribute to the schools not as customers
or vendors but in traditional volunteer roles,
supportive of goals deﬁned by the district.
Though these activities are important, they do
not involve agenda setting or the co-construc-
tion of policy and therefore do not contribute
to the development of civic capacity.63 
District staff members also describe working
with members of the community to craft the
“Declaration of Education” (the SRC’s list of
overarching goals that drives reform in
Philadelphia) and the plan for capital improve-
ments to schools (Education Program
Specialists – School District of Philadelphia,
August 2006). These initiatives held out the
promise of involving parents and other mem-
bers of the public in agenda setting, but in
reality they fell far short. Rather than provid-
ing an opportunity for on-going collaboration
and joint agenda setting, they were short-lived,
and parents’ and community-members’ roles
were limited to providing input without being
able to track how, or if, their input inﬂuenced
the ultimate decisions.
In fact, the district has often pledged to create
more substantive vehicles for public participa-
tion, but it has repeatedly failed to follow
through on these promises. Plans for 
community groups to partner with private
providers of school management simply failed
to materialize without explanation,64 as did
proposals for “regional parent advisory
groups” and quarterly public meetings. 
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Conclusion: Civic Capacity and
the New Market Paradigm
In this chapter we have shown how a market
orientation to public education has shaped the
School District of Philadelphia’s interaction
with the public. The district’s focus on public
relations and reversing the district’s negative
image seems to have had the desired effect.
Many in the business and nonproﬁt communi-
ties have expressed cautious optimism, noting
that the district appeared to be more open and
innovative and to have broken out of its old
bureaucratic style. By creating new entry
points for involvement through contracts and
partnerships—as well as a positive climate for
charter schools and a growing list of public
school options—the district has increased the
number and range of players involved in some
way in the education of Philadelphia’s youth.
The district also showed it could be a respon-
sive institution through a new emphasis on
customer service that has established a pletho-
ra of avenues through which individual fami-
lies can seek help with their children’s social
or academic problems.
Despite this array of interactions with the
 public, all important and laudable, the SRC and
district management are not open and accessi-
ble when it comes to making decisions or
assigning contracts. Instead, they have devel-
oped practices that prevent public actors from
having access to the information they need to
be full collaborators in setting agendas for
reform. This lack of transparency is especially
troublesome in a privatizing environment,
which makes particular demands both on the
district and the public. Indeed, for the public to
play its essential role in monitoring contractual
agreements for efﬁcacy, efﬁciency and fairness,
the School District must share information and
make decisions in the public eye. Without trans-
parency, there is no public accountability and
without public accountability, the ground is
shaky for building the kind of collaborative
activity that moves reform forward. 
In addition, when it has encouraged public
participation, the district has channeled
involvement narrowly. Contracting, communi-
cating, and customer service reify hierarchies
of power favorable to the district, which then
weaken Philadelphia’s citizens as collective
players in education reform. Choice furthers
individual responsibility over collective action
and well-being. The district’s modes of interac-
tion need to be expanded to include forums for
debate, clear channels for public input, and
protection from retribution for those who speak
out. Funding is needed to support these types
of expanded activities. With these changes, the
district could more effectively play its role in
creating an environment for the building of
civic capacity.
Of course, school districts are not solely
responsible for building civic capacity. Civic
capacity is the result of a collective effort, and
the school district is only one of the many ele-
ments in a city that come together in a collab-
oration if education reform is to be enduring
and equitable. In this context, however, it is
the special responsibility of the district to be
open to collaborative interactions with the
public. In other words, the district should help
foster the conditions for, rather than impede,
the development of civic capacity. 
In Chapter One and Chapter Two of this
report, we have examined the effect of the
growing allegiance to market models on the
development of civic capacity from two per-
spectives: the political and economic context
of the city and the structures and orientation
of the School District. In Chapter Three we
turn our attention to four groups working to
affect education policy and practice from dif-
ferent vantage points and what their experi-
ences reveal about the promises and impedi-
ments to building civic capacity in
Philadelphia.
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Without transparency there is no public
accountability, and without public
accountability, the ground is shaky for
building the kind of  collaborative activity
that moves reform forward.  
In the previous chapters, we explained that
now market discourses dominate ideas about
how to solve city and school district problems,
overshadowing, but not totally displacing dis-
cussion about an equitable distribution of
resources. We also showed how the School
District adopted a business model which, in
conjunction with a top-down management
structure, focused on swift and sweeping
change, creating an environment adverse to
the development of civic capacity. 
In this chapter we draw on four case studies of
local organizations involved with education.
These cases provide important insight into
local politics and community activity focused
on education reform, helping us move from
the contextual discussions of the previous
chapters to what is actually happening “on the
ground.” We show the implications of the
work of these groups for civic capacity
through an analysis of how these groups
develop and pursue their agendas, interact
with the district, and experience different lev-
els of success in achieving their goals. While
some of these important educational efforts do
have the potential to help build civic capacity,
the familiar tale of unresolved tensions and
power differentials continues to make 
dialogue, cooperation, and alliances across 
different economic and regional sectors of the
city difﬁcult. 
Our four case studies are: the Center City
Schools Initiative (CCSI), Philadelphia
Student Union and Youth United for Change
(youth organizing), the Black Alliance for
Educational Options (BAEO), and the
Philadelphia Education First Compact (the
Compact). These cases were chosen to repre-
sent a variety of types of involvement with
education as well as a range of positions along
the market-social welfare continuum. These
groups also represent a range of perspectives
on the city’s future, the role education plays in
that future, and the geographic, economic and
racial diversity of the city. Each group also has
a unique connection to the School District as
well as to its own social network. (Chart C in
the Appendix shows the variation among the
case study groups on several key dimensions:
primary theory of action; constituency, geo-
graphic base; type of leadership; etc.). In the
sections that follow, we will tell the “story” of
each group and discuss its activities in light of
civic capacity.
The Center City Schools Initiative: New
Groups, New Resources, New Divisions
The Center City Schools Initiative (CCSI) is
sponsored by the Center City District (CCD),
one of the country’s premier business
improvement districts, which for the past 17
years has promoted the revitalization of Center
City as key to city and regional economic
growth. Launched in 2004, CSSI has identiﬁed
schools as one important aspect of the broader
revitalization project. The initiative’s funda-
mental premise is that enhanced school choice
will cement Center City’s status as a desirable
residential neighborhood by appealing to mid-
dle- and upper-income families who might
otherwise leave the city for the suburbs. 
The CCD is funded by Center City businesses
and institutions, and its leader, Paul Levy, a
respected Philadelphia ﬁgure, is often credited
as the driving force behind Center City’s
resurgence. Independent of partisan politics,
Levy has built a network of contacts and
allies that includes many of the city’s institu-
tions, including the SRC and the School
District. Because of the CCD’s stature and
connections, when it approached the district
with a proposal to work together to attract 
and retain “professional” families to the
schools, the organization was received enthu-
siastically by the district, and a partnership
formed soon after. 
While Center City was already home to some
of the most high-achieving elementary schools
in the city, including the “Big Three” (a set of
K-8 schools that historically attracted appli-
cants from all over the city hoping to escape
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low-performing neighborhood schools),65
middle- and upper-middle-class parents in the
area still hesitated to use their neighborhood
schools, often choosing to move to the suburbs
when their children reached school-age. To
convince these parents to stay, the district and
CCD devised a multi-pronged approach,
including: altering the district’s administrative
structure to consolidate all schools in and near
Center City into one newly created “region;”
creating a new admissions policy giving fami-
lies within the region priority over other fami-
lies in admissions to Center City schools;
launching a marketing campaign (including
ﬂiers, a new website, and public events); mak-
ing improvements to individual schools that
would make them more “marketable;” culti-
vating institutional “partners” for Center City
schools (such as a local science museum to
enhance science programming or a nearby the-
ater to work with the performing arts); and
helping the schools become more “customer
friendly” as a way of competing with inde-
pendent schools. 
CEO Vallas and some members of the School
Reform Com mis sion shared Levy’s interest in poli-
cies designed to attract and retain middle-class
families to the schools and the city. They
believed that if middle-class families could be
convinced to live downtown— buying real
estate, patronizing local businesses, and pay-
ing taxes —they would bolster the city’s tax
base and attract more businesses. Thus, these
families could be a force for economic growth
and prosperity, with trickle-down beneﬁts for
the broader Philadelphia community and its
schools.
The School District reaped ﬁnancial and other
material and political gains as a result of its
relationship to the CCD. For example, the
CCD was able to rally architects to draw up
plans for signiﬁcant improvements to the “Big
Three” Center City schools. At a broader level,
the CCD provided the district with assistance
on real estate, fundraising, and other issues
(CCSI Administrator, April 2005). Perhaps
even more importantly, Levy lent the district
his prestige, helping to build credibility within
the larger civic and business community at a
time when the district was working hard to
restore its legitimacy. As one CCSI administra-
tor explained, “We did a lot of things for the
district… . They were making a large public
show of their Declaration of Education, and
Paul Levy showed up there to publicly endorse
them” (June 2005). Levy also supported the
district’s position in contract negotiations with
the teachers’ union, standing with the head of
the Chamber of Commerce, CEO Vallas, the
School Reform Commission, and other local
dignitaries at the School District’s press con-
ference; the district then quoted Levy’s praise
of its contract plans in subsequent publicity.
Levy’s presence, and his willingness to create
a visible link between his well-respected
organization and the School District, signaled
conﬁdence in the district’s leadership and its
program for reform. 
District and CCD leaders worked together
behind closed doors to move the initiative
 rapidly from idea to implementation, with
minimal public input or oversight. CCSI thus
was able to sidestep any potential controversy
it might generate as an initiative favoring a
single region of the city and the relatively
advantaged population living there. In the
opinion of a CCSI administrator, neither the
CCD nor the School District, wary of contro-
versy, made a big announcement about the
new region because they wanted to “put off
the conversation” about comparison to other
parts of Philadelphia (July 2005). 
In fact, CCSI was worrisome to many, both
within the school administration and the com-
munity at-large. Because CCSI would bring
resources to schools that were already relative-
ly advantaged and high-performing in one of
the most afﬂuent areas of the city, it was, in
the words of one long-time education advo-
cate, “a lightning rod” for controversy over
equity (July 2005). According to a one district
administrator, CCSI’s message could be inter-
preted as: “… offering basically to a white,
middle-class population things we have not
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65 The “Big Three” are Greenfield, Meredith, and
McCall Elementary Schools.
67 Snyder, S. (2006, February 16). Neighbors Get
An Edge in Getting into Center City Schools.
[Electronic version]. Philadelphia Inquirer.
offered to families of color who are poor, but
since we want these [middle-class] people to
stay here, we’re going to offer this, but too
bad for you other folks” (July 2006). Disa -
gree ment within the School District was
chieﬂy between those who shared the CCD’s
theory of action (largely from the upper eche-
lons of the administration) and mid-level staff
members who believed that the district should
give precedence to equity over urban revital-
ization. Many of these staffers were attuned to
the injustice that a number of local organiza-
tions, especially within the African American
community, believed this initiative represented. 
In response to those concerns, some district
staff, along with local elected ofﬁcials, pushed
for a broader deﬁnition of “Center City”
that would include signiﬁcant numbers of
low-income students in the new region.
One district administrator recalled, “We
struggled with what the region would look
like around these equity concerns” (July
2006). A resulting compromise, in fact, did
expand the boundaries deﬁning Center City
so the demographics of CCSI schools now
match the demographics of the school dis-
trict as a whole, ensuring that many low-
income students would beneﬁt from the ini-
tiative too. This, and positioning the initia-
tive as a “pilot project” to be replicated in
other regions, satisﬁed many of the critics,
especially  those from within the district.
CCSI also proposed changes to the school
transfer policy that would privilege Center
City families, which raised further concerns
about equity.66 Again, this was controversial
because the region was home to some of the
city’s highest performing and most desirable
elementary schools. When the transfer policy
met strong objections, the district backed off,
amending the policy by adding speciﬁc lan-
guage giving priority to students transferring
under NCLB and making other provisions for
equity. Still, the two SRC commissioners
appointed by the mayor were not satisﬁed.
Explaining her “no” vote at an SRC meeting,
Commissioner Sandra Dungee-Glenn argued
that as long as educational opportunities across
the district varied so widely, any changes to
the transfer policy were premature:
I get so many calls in my office from
parents who are struggling and some-
times almost in tears about trying to
get access to schools that they believe
are better. That’s stressful…. The real
answer is to make all of our schools
quality schools... and, until we reach
that goal, try to keep the doors as
open as possible across the district.67 
Nonetheless, the policy passed, with
Commissioners later agreeing to a resolution
promising the equal provision of educational
options across all regions.
Despite these changes, equity concerns
remain. The decision to give priority in admis-
sions to Center City elementary schools to
Center City families has made it difﬁcult, if
not impossible, for students from outside of
the area to use the regular transfer process to
gain access to some of the city’s most highly
regarded elementary schools. Though the dis-
trict has not made data available on student
placements through either the NCLB or tradi-
tional process, several district administrators
conﬁrmed that no students from outside Center
City achieved admissions to the “Big Three”
schools through the normal transfer process
(Personal Communication, March 2006; Jan.
2007). In addition, while professional families
bring many important resources to public
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66 Historically, students from across the district
have applied for admissions to a number of high-
performing elementary schools in Center City.
Before CCSI, any spots left over after all students
from within a school’s catchment area had enrolled
were opened up to students from all over the city
who participated in a lottery process. Under the
new policy, admissions priority is as follows: 1)
catchment area students; 2) students transferring
under the federal NCLB mandates; 3) students
from within Center City; 4) students from the rest
of the district. This makes it very difficult—if not
impossible—for students from outside of Center
City to achieve access to desirable elementary
schools in the region.
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schools, efforts to attract these families can
serve to marginalize other parents and students
in the schools, raising further concerns about a
policy that identiﬁes certain families as more
desirable than others.68 This negative, if unin-
tended, consequence can contribute not only to
conﬂict and divisions within a school commu-
nity, but can serve to fragment groups interest-
ed in public education citywide. 
Discussion
With respect to civic capacity in Philadelphia,
CCSI represents both a catalyst and a chal-
lenge. The initiative usefully increases the
number of organizations and constituencies
that are involved with, and invested in, the
city’s schools. At the same time, as evidenced
by the controversies surrounding the initiative
from its inception, CCSI also has the potential
to exacerbate inequalities across the district
and serve as a divisive force within the city.
There are a number of ways in which CCSI
could contribute to the development of civic
capacity around education in Philadelphia.
For example, the establishment of a formalized
partnership between such a powerful business
organization as the CCD and the School
District of Philadelphia generates new energy
for the schools and draws other organizations
(such as Center City businesses and cultural
institutions) into relationships with them. By
attracting professional families to the schools,
CCSI also helps bring in a constituency whose
resources—in the form of social, political, and
economic capital—allow it to be an effective
advocate for public education. The partnership
between the School District and the CCD is
also symbolically signiﬁcant: in working with
the district, the CCD shares its prestige and
credibility and helps generate much-needed
public conﬁdence in the district. Finally,
CCSI links the schools with the future of the
city, showing that schools can play a role in
helping the city remain  economically viable.
By emphasizing the interconnection between
the fate of the city and its schools, CCSI could
contribute to the development of civic capacity
by bringing new urgency and purpose to the
task of improving the schools. 
CCSI also has the potential to impede the
development of civic capacity in Philadelphia
for several reasons. First, the initiative focuses
only on Center City and the neighborhoods
immediately adjacent to it rather than on the
city as a whole. Second, CCSI positions a
 sector of the city’s population (professional
families) as more important to the city’s future
than other sectors. Inherently divisive, this
positioning impedes the creation of a sense of
common fate among all families in the School
District. For low-income constituencies, the
initiative reinforces their distrust of the district
and its policies. Third, though CCSI has been
modiﬁed in the face of concerns about equity,
it nevertheless directs resources towards schools
and neighborhoods that are already relatively
advantaged, thereby exacerbating inequities
across the city. Finally, by operating largely
outside of the public eye so as to avoid con -
troversy, CCD’s partnership with the School
District sacriﬁces transparency and public trust
for expediency. CCSI may have moved forward
quickly as a result of decisions made behind
closed doors, but, as we have noted previously,
such lack of transparency is a barrier to open
collaboration and the development of a shared
vision for the schools. 
Youth Organizing—
Capacity at the Local Level 
The Philadelphia youth organizing groups,
Youth United for Change (YUC) and the
Phila delphia Student Union (PSU), are two of
the oldest youth organizing groups in the
country, working since 1991 and 1995 respec-
tively to develop youth as leaders who can
positively effect change in their schools and
communities. Organizing youth in low-income,
predominately African American and Latino
areas of the city, both YUC and PSU have gar-
nered national reputations for their work, and
its members are often called upon to speak at
68 Cucchiara, M. (2007). Marketing Schools,
Marketing Cities: Urban Revitalization, Public
Education, and Social Inequality. Unpublished
 doctoral dissertation. University of Pennsylvania.
(Call No. L001 2007 .C963).
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national events. Their activism has had an
impact on district policies and practices, bring-
ing new programs and resources to the schools
where there are chapters. At the time of the
state takeover of Philadelphia schools the two
youth organizing groups jointly led the opposi-
tion to privatization, especially the large role
proposed for Edison Schools, Inc. Their activi-
ties, in conjunction with others, pressured the
newly appointed SRC to reduce the role for
Edison Schools, Inc. and to adopt a diverse
provider model. Since then, these groups have
continued to work together, and on their own,
to develop campaigns to bring
small high schools to their under-
served neighborhoods in coordina-
tion with the School District’s
small schools initiative.69
The story we present here is about
YUC’s and PSU’s campaigns for
small schools. The campaigns take
place in West Philadelphia,
Kensington, and Olney, three mid-
dle- to low-income neighbor-
hoods, each with a unique racial
and ethnic makeup. Each neigh-
borhood has had its own distinc-
tive history of development and
each is positioned differently than
the other in terms of the city’s
plan for revitalization. 
Despite their differing characteristics, each of
the three neighborhoods sits in the crosshairs
of city-wide tensions over the balance between
economic growth policies and equity. In
attempting to draw attention and resources
to low-resource communities and improve
schools for the lower-income populations that
reside there, these youth groups are ﬁghting 
the prevailing trend to invest in neighborhoods
largely to attract and beneﬁt middle-class pro-
fessionals, frequently at the expense of the
populations that already reside in these areas.
Their challenge is to build the inﬂuence and
political will to make their neighborhoods and
constituencies a priority, even in the face of
diminished belief among the city’s business
and elite leadership in strong social welfare
policy.
The low-income communities in which these
youth live and go to school have traditionally
been considered a detriment to educational
attainment, not a force for improvement; and
the youth themselves have traditionally been
the object of—not participants in—reform
efforts. The resistance community leaders have
experienced to their efforts to improve public
schools has been frustrating and reﬂects the
disregard in which they have been held. One
community leader reﬂected, for example, that
“dealing with the district is a little bit like
throwing small stones at an elephant. Why
bother to do that? You’re only going to
 aggravate him, and he’ll whack you, but
it won’t change it” (August 2005).
Despite the uphill battle, the youth organizing
groups have seized the School District’s small
schools initiative as a means to bring positive
change to their neighborhoods, and have
worked to mobilize public and district support
for making their own neighborhoods, and the
lowest-income constituencies within those
neighborhoods, a priority for the proposed
small high schools. Working jointly with adult
organizers, youth leaders are striving to recruit
other youth to their ranks and mobilize reli-
gious and neighborhood leaders, local political
leaders, and citywide allies from the school
reform community. By advocating for
improved educational opportunities for
themselves and future generations of students
in their neighborhoods, the youth organizing
groups ﬁll what one local politician identiﬁed
as a “civic gap” or a lack of adult advocacy
for educational reform. “In the wake of no
parental involvement,” this politician 
By advocating for
improved educa-
tional opportunities
for themselves and
future generations
of students, the
youth organizing
groups fill  a “civic
gap”—a lack of
adult advocacy for
educational reform.
69 The School District of Philadelphia announced an
interest in “smaller schools” as early as 2002, but
its Small Schools Transition Project was formally
launched in early 2005. In Philadelphia, the School
District considers a school of 700 students or less
as small. YUC and PSU, more in line with national
thinking about what constitutes small, have pushed
for no more than 100 students per class, or schools
of 400 students or less (9th-12th). Since 2002,
Philadelphia has created 27 “small” schools, of
which 23 have less than 500 students. 
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commented, “that’s when the students stepped
up to speak for themselves, because nobody
was speaking for them” (June 2006). Indeed,
the activism of the PSU and YUC members
has inspired a number of local elected ofﬁ-
cials, religious and neighborhood leaders, and
 parents  to support their campaigns. As one
local leader stated, “My children should be able
to get a quality education right in their neigh-
borhood schools! …I shouldn’t have to send
my kid cross town! Really!” (June 2006). In
addition, many  community adults viewed the
campaigns to improve the local high schools as
more than an educational reform project. As
one community member reﬂected, “A high
school that works is important to the health of
any community, and how can you be one with
this total dysfunctional symbol of uncaring?”
(June 2006). The local high schools’ inability
to engage young people and keep them in
school was a major contributor to high rates of
 truancy, in the mind of this community mem-
ber. Truant adolescents were damaging to the
long-term well-being of the neighborhood
because they contributed to the perception that
these neighborhoods were not safe.
However, because they represent low-income
neighborhoods, the youth groups do not have
social networks at their disposal that can trade
off resources and prestige for a district com-
mitment to their goals. The youth groups have
focused on creating a web of allies at the com-
munity level and within the citywide advocacy
and school reform communities through the
Education First Compact and the Philadelphia
Cross City Campaign. However, their net-
works, for the most part, do not en compass
citywide business and civic leaders. Several
Philadelphia foundations, however, have sup-
ported the youth organizing, and these founda-
tions have helped to build the power of these
groups by providing them with both resources
and increased legitimacy. In contrast to the
CCD, which is positioned among the city’s
elites, the youth groups are not “sitting at the
table” with key city and district leaders, and,
also in contrast to the CCD, they ﬁnd them-
selves disadvantaged in the district’s environ-
ment of centralized, behind-closed-doors deci-
sion making. 
As part of its capital improvement plan to
build new small schools (or break existing
large high schools into smaller ones), the dis-
trict developed its own planning process, that,
while streamlined and typically focused on
quick results, was also designed to satisfy
expectations for “community involvement.”
The youth groups did not believe the district’s
process either fully represented the breadth
and diversity of their neighborhoods, nor gave
students enough voice in the planning. They
advocated for a broader and deeper process
that would be student and community driven,
and at a public action in spring 2005, won the
commitment of the School District for a new
planning process. 
The William Penn Foundation, interested
in both school reform and neighborhood
development, has been among the Philadel phia
foundations supporting the youth groups. The
Foun dation sees the school planning pro cess
as an opportunity to further its dual objectives
to improve schools and neighborhoods. Using
its national connections, the Foundation locat-
ed an architectural design ﬁrm, Co n cordia,
LLC, with a track record in community plan-
ning and support for the design of innovative
small schools. The Foundation brought
Concordia to Philadelphia to meet the youth
groups, and with the approval of the youth
groups, in summer 2005 Concordia began a
planning process with the two chapters that
were the furthest along in their campaigns,
those in the West and Kensington neighbor-
hoods. The Philadelphia Education Fund
“Action! The word of choice for small
schools’ future. This is what we need. A
large mass movement of students, parents,
teachers,  supporters, and believers.” 
—Student Activist, January 2005
70 www.philaedfund.org/kensingtonhs/pdf/kfinalre-
port.pdf 
www.philaedfund.org/westphillyhs/pdf/
wfinalreport.pdf
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(PEF), a citywide school reform group and
supporter of the youth organizing groups,
served as Concordia’s local partner. Concordia
was excited by the prospect of working with
youth leaders, and the youth groups were con-
vinced that working with Concordia was their
best option for ensuring that the district would
collaborate with the local community to design
the new small schools, as well as follow
through with its commitment and actually
build them. 
Concordia’s planning process brought multiple
community leaders, residents, students, and
organizations, as well as school principals,
teachers and staff, and key central ofﬁce staff
together for a seven-month planning process.
The process resulted in a comprehensive
report for each site that reﬂected community
assets and a plan for small schools. In spring
2006, the reports and their recommendations
were presented to top-level district staff and
the SRC, as well as shared with community
and citywide supporters.70 The reports outlined
the community planning process, and a vision
for the new small schools, including gover-
nance, budgeting, curricular and student sup-
port guidelines, as well as plans for facilities
and potential sites for new construction. The
professional quality of the reports and of the
student and community presentations
impressed district leaders and helped to
enhance the legitimacy of the process. 
Concordia and PEF staff served as advocates
for the community involvement process. As 
a Concordia staff member explained, the 
purpose of the process was to shift the locus of
control away from the district and toward the
community:
The question on the table at the end
of the day was, “Is the community
involved in the district’s planning
process or is this district involved in
the community’s process?” From our
perspective, it is the last. This is
about the district participating in a
much broader community planning
process that includes education as
opposed to the community being
involved in the district’s process
(March 2005).
Over time, the mobilization of a wide array of
groups created the momentum necessary to
gain top administrators’ attention. As one
youth organizer saw it, 
… the value of [the Concordia plan-
ning process] was the amount of
community input that went into it so
we can come and say from a plan-
ning point of view … . “These are
the recommendations of a very
diverse, large community planning
process.” Do you know what I mean?
So it does bring a certain element of
power and backing. It wasn’t the
small select group ... it was 143
people in the neighborhood that
came together for a planning process
(Sept. 2006).
In both West and Kensington the youth organ-
izing groups successfully transformed the dis-
trict’s narrow planning process into a broad-
based effort. “Sustainability Circles” of youth,
community adults, and educators, established
through the Concordia process, continue to
meet regularly to ensure follow-up to the plan-
ning. In the third community, Olney, 
“Today was the SRC meeting and I was nervous all
day because I have never spoken in a meeting this
big. It was hard for me to understand the things they
were talking about because it seemed to me that
they were speaking in code. When my turn came up
all of YUC students that were there cheered me on. It
comforted me a  little but I was still really nervous,
but I still did it and I think I did a good job.”
—Student Activist, January 2005
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mentioned earlier, YUC is building a commu-
nity-driven planning process on its own. Thus
far, in all three neighborhoods the youth
organizing groups and their allies have suc-
ceeded in getting district funds earmarked to
build new small high schools or to renovate
existing facilities to create smaller secondary
education options. In fall 2007, the SRC com-
mitted to purchase a site for a new small
school in Kensington. Yet, the School
District’s commitment to this student-driven,
community-based initiative is fragile and
budget deﬁcits can easily jeopardize the
groups’ plans. As the SRC prioritizes capital
expenditures, the youth and community soli-
darity created during the planning processes at
all three schools and continued through the
Sustainability Circles at West and Kensington,
serves to monitor the district and hold it to its
promises.
In sum, although small high schools were a
part of the School District’s reform initiatives,
the youth organizing groups mobilized neigh-
borhood, citywide and political allies to ensure
that their neighborhoods would be prioritized
in the district’s small schools plan, and that
their schools would reﬂect an inclusive com-
munity-based planning process. Arguably, the
West and Kensington planning process altered
the youth organizing groups’ outsider status.
Recognized as effective community leaders,
these two youth organizations have moved
toward being productive collaborators with
the School District. Their work on the small
schools campaign has also had positive
 community effects. Already the mobilization
efforts have helped keep the needs and aspira-
tions of a few low-income neighborhoods
 visible in a city where economic growth poli-
cies often trump broader social welfare goals.
PSU and YUC have enhanced the ability of
community-based groups to align scarce city
and district resources with the needs of their
neighborhoods. To keep the district focused on
allocating the necessary resources and improv-
ing neighborhood high schools in a time of ﬁs-
cal scarcity, however, these groups must con-
tinue to apply pressure to district leadership.
PSU and YUC have become a critical force in
the city, demanding the district’s engagement
and respect. These youth groups hold the
School District to a standard expected of all
public institutions—to be transparent, equi-
table, and fair.
Discussion
In many ways, then, PSU and YUC
contribute to civic capacity around
education in Philadel phia and repre-
sent important vehicles for the culti-
vation of future leadership and
activism. Like the CCD, they bring
a signiﬁcant constituency—in this
case, youth—to the table in a new
way. This is particularly critical because the
youth involved in PSU and YUC represent
low-income communities that have traditional-
ly been excluded from decision-making
processes and have had little say over what
happens with respect to the schools in their
neighborhoods. Youth organizing also brings
community groups from these neighborhoods
into the school reform conversation, making
an explicit connection between schools and
neighborhood development. In the current
market-oriented environment, these con-
stituencies have an important role to play in
making sure that resources are distributed
equitably rather than being directed dispropor-
tionately towards neighborhoods targeted for
revitalization. 
YUC and PSU clearly build civic capacity at
the local level: they have energized their
neighborhoods around public education; they
have helped students and community members
develop leadership skills; they have kept their
neighborhoods visible and a priority for small
schools; and they have pushed the district to
work with them as collaborators. However,
they participate in a limited set of citywide
networks, consisting primarily of school
reform groups. This means the youth organiz-
ing groups are not part of larger conversations
about the city’s future, thereby limiting their
ability to build civic capacity. As well, their
focus on speciﬁc neighborhoods, albeit low-
income neighborhoods, holds similar problems
for civic capacity as the CCD’s focus on
PSU and YUC have
become a critical
force in the city,
demanding the 
district’s engage-
ment and respect. 
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Center City. In both cases, the groups involved
are using their power to work for group or
constituency interests, with the assumption
that education policy represents a “zero-sum
game” of sorts, with neighborhoods divided
against each other in the contest for resources.
In other words, neither the CCD nor the youth
groups are working toward a negotiated vision
that addresses the need for both economic
growth and equity.
BAEO — Elevating School Choice 
The Black Alliance for Educational Options
(BAEO) is a national organization with several
local afﬁliates. With African Americans mak-
ing up two-thirds of the city’s public school
population,71 the Philadelphia BAEO is one of
its most active branches. The mission of BAEO
is to enhance school choice for low- and mod-
erate-income Black students and to inspire
their parents to become effective educational
consumers and advocates for their children.
The national BAEO is known for advocating a
range of means to enhance school choice,
including the controversial voucher strategy.
The Philadelphia chapter primarily champions
policies favorable to the expansion of charter
school options and state-sponsored corporate
tax credits.72
BAEO represents a key constituency for public
education in the city. By helping parents be
more informed about their options and learn to
“work the system,” it provides an important
service. BAEO’s adherents see their participa-
tion in its Parents with Power workshops as
transformative and empowering. Pointing out
that the public system has historically failed
Black children, BAEO advocates for parents to
ﬁnd the right educational “ﬁt” for their children,
including such public school alternatives as
charter schools. A scholarship program that
offers ﬁnancial assistance for private education
provides additional options. For many parents,
often desperate and seeking alternative educa-
tional options for their children, BAEO is a
source of information, insight, and tangible help. 
BAEO was brought to Philadelphia through
the efforts of one of the city’s powerful
African American political leaders, State
Representative Dwight Evans. Evans’ district
encompasses middle- and working-class
neighborhoods in the Northwest section of
Philadelphia. Charter schools and school
choice are an important part of Evans’ agenda
and that of the Ogontz Avenue Community
Development Corporation (OARC), which is
closely associated with him and largely
responsible for the revitalization of neighbor-
hoods in his district. BAEO’s ofﬁce is located
in an OARC revitalized shopping center in the
Northwest neighborhood.
BAEO embodies two lines of thought about
school choice. On the one hand, the national
organization, consistent with mainstream dis-
course about school choice in urban areas,
promotes choice as a means of improving the
quality of education. For its Black constituents
in particular, BAEO promotes choice as a way
of creating educational equity for low-income,
urban students by providing high quality edu-
cational options, sometimes as alternatives to
their low-performing neighborhood schools.
BAEO’s local leaders enthusiastically share
this view, arguing that enhanced school choice
is a matter of equity. They also view choice,
particularly the promise that choice will open
up more high quality options for Black chil-
dren, as key to retaining the middle class and
staving off neighborhood decline, an argument
that we discussed in Chapter One. 
Representative Evans’ embrace of choice as a
school improvement strategy is closely related
to his other economic development strategies
designed to stabilize communities. For exam-
ple, he has sponsored a statewide initiative to
71 The School District of Philadelphia uses the term
African American to refer to African Americans,
Black Africans, and Caribbeans. BAEO uses the
term Black to refer to these groups. For the purpos-
es of this section, we will use the term Black as
consistent with BAEO. 
72 The state has set up the Education Improvement
Tax Credit, which enables businesses to get a tax
deduction for contributions, in this case, to a fund
for scholarships for low-income students to attend
private and parochial schools.
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re-establish supermarkets in low-income areas
that had been abandoned earlier. He also spon-
sored a neighborhood-based “kid zone” in his
Philadelphia district that would coordinate
services for children. Like other moderate-
income neighborhoods, Evans’ district in
Northwest Philadelphia has experienced sig-
niﬁcant population decline in recent years,
partly because its middle and working class
families have left the city in search of better
public schools. By pushing for expanded
school choice, particularly in the form of char-
ter schools, BAEO’s efforts reﬂect local com-
munity development leaders’ belief in choice
as a means to retain economic diversity by
keeping middle and working-class families in
the area. Thus, though BAEO and CCSI target
different populations—middle- and working-
class families as opposed to “knowledge work-
ers,” respectively—the two organizations share
the goals of improving the quality of city life
both for those tied by economic circumstances
to the city and for those who were inclined to
leave by giving them options for their chil-
dren’s education. 
Although Evans is probably BAEO’s most
inﬂuential supporter, it has other important
allies, such as state senator Anthony Hardy
Williams, who represents parts of West Phila -
delphia, and the Greater Philadelphia Urban
Affairs Coalition (GPUAC), a citywide organi-
zation that unites neighborhoods, business, and
government. As a result, BAEO’s efforts reach
beyond Philadelphia’s Northwest
 neighborhoods to target Black parents more
widely, advocate for the establishment of
 charter schools citywide, and collaborate
with other Philadelphia organizations on issues
related to parent information and school choice. 
Although the Black community does not speak
with one voice in support of charters and
choice, in the opinion of one BAEO board
member, “BAEO has inﬂuence in the political
arena for initiatives that have to do with
school choice. They can speak for the Black
community, [when] it comes to school choice”
(May 2006). By adopting policies that are
favorable to charter schools, the district gains
credibility with an inﬂuential segment of
Philadelphia’s Black community. 
Indeed, the School District’s change of attitude
about charter schools from unwelcoming to, in
the words of BAEO leadership, “charter
friendly” is at least in part due to the group’s
strong political inﬂuence on district leaders.
Representative Evans’ connections to the city
and state political power structure and to lead-
ers in the city’s Black community have been
critical to BAEO’s ability to advance its agen-
da. Evans holds a powerful position in the
state capitol of Harrisburg as the Democratic
Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee. In 1997, Evans joined with those
across the political aisle to support the
Commonwealth’s pro-charter school legisla-
tion, and, in 2001, he was a strong supporter
of the state takeover of the School District of
Philadelphia. In addition to helping create an
environment conducive to privatization and
charters, Evans has also worked on the local
level to increase the number of educational
options in his area. He is closely associated
with three charter schools in his district and
historically has had a close relationship with
the nonproﬁt Foundations, Inc., one of the pri-
vate providers of school management that
manages six schools in or adjacent to Evans’
district.73 As one of BAEO’s board members
said, referring to Evans and Williams (who is
also on BAEO’s board), “They were the guys
who were really behind this whole charter
school movement… .Paul Vallas knows he
better listen to BAEO” (May 2006).
According to its leadership, BAEO’s stance is
not anti-public school. Its leaders argue that,
although BAEO’s strategy is not focused
directly on improving the district’s neighbor-
hood schools, the organization believes char-
ters can play an indirect role in bringing about
improvement:
73 This number represents the schools managed by
Foundations, Inc. during the 2006-2007 school
year. 
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Now, what I think will happen over
time is, BAEO, and organizations like
BAEO, will scratch off enough kids
to build a critical mass of achieve-
ment outside the public school sys-
tem, which will then put pressure on
the [schools] to change. Because
they’re not going to change on their
own (BAEO Board Member, May
2006).
In this way, BAEO’s energies are focused on
creating options so that parents have choices
beyond their neighborhood public schools with
the idea that this will improve the district as a
whole. 
BAEO’s approach echoes the School District’s
emphasis on parents as consumers. BAEO has
built a reputation as an organiza-
tion that can work effectively with
parents through its outreach pro-
grams and workshops. Aiming to
help parents take advantage of the
options open to them, BAEO pro-
vides tools and resources that
strengthen Black parents to be
advocates for their children’s edu-
cation. On the basis of BAEO’s
reputation, the district contracted
with the organization to ﬁnd and
train parent volunteers to staff
school-based Parent Welcome
Desks. Working with the public
schools in this way gives BAEO
access to the low-income parents
that they were having difﬁculty
reaching through word of mouth,
thus serving their mission.
BAEO has also focused on mobilizing parents
for political action in support of school choice.
In 2006, BAEO organized parents to lobby in
Harrisburg to increase the tax credits business-
es can earn when they contribute to scholar-
ship funds that help low-income children to
attend private schools. Its staff and parent
activists also participate, on occasion, in pub-
lic forums advocating for school choice.
Discussion
BAEO has inspired and strengthened the abili-
ty of many parents in Philadelphia to address
their children’s educational needs. It has bene-
ﬁted from the district’s openness to charter
schools and contributed to an expansion of
educational options. In doing so, it has
increased the number of people active in edu-
cation causes and reform in the city. 
Despite these contributions, however, we con-
clude that BAEO’s activity does not support
civic capacity for public school reform in
Philadelphia for several reasons. Unique
among the cases that we describe here, BAEO
skirts the district as a target of change and
aims directly at parents instead. First, while its
leaders insist that BAEO is not “anti-public
school,” the fact remains that the organization
does not think that targeting the public school
system for reform is a viable strategy. That is,
rather than strengthen parents’ connection and
ability to work to improve local schools and
the local system, it has gone around the local
system—using its political muscle with the
state to build momentum for charter schools
and expand scholarship funds to private
schools for low- and moderate-income fami-
lies. As a result, BAEO facilitates a process
that drains support from the public schools
rather than using its considerable potential as a
voice for Black parents to build support and
work towards system-wide improvement. In
other words, BAEO promotes an exit strategy
rather than direct engagement for improving
the city’s school system. 
Of course, individual charter schools may well
help to build civic capacity on the local level
since they provide new opportunities for fami-
lies and community members to be involved in
a very immediate way. Indeed, as one civic
leader noted, for some neighborhoods—
and especially for Black, Latino, and Asian
communities—charter schools have become 
an important focus of activity around educa-
tion (February 2007). However, the very
nature of charter schools means that the sort of
capacity they help to generate is limited to the
In order to help
parents take
advantage of
the options
open to them,
BAEO provides
tools and
resources that
strengthen
Black parents’
advocacy for
their children’s
education.
individual school and does not beneﬁt the chil-
dren in the district as a whole. If anything, by
enlisting local leaders and community mem-
bers in support of particular schools, charter
schools draw attention—and valuable civic
energy—away from the district-run schools.
And, effective and innovative as some charter
schools may be, it is the traditional public
schools that enroll the vast majority of
Philadelphia’s students. 
In pushing for greater educational options and
training parents to be advocates for their chil-
dren, BAEO’s efforts position parents as indi-
vidual consumers in the educational market-
place, a focus that does not encourage parents
to work collectively to improve the public
schools for all. Thus, while BAEO may per-
form a number of important services around
enhancing school choice and involving parents
in their children’s education, its primary activ-
ities run counter to what is necessary to build
civic capacity. 
The Compact: Creating a “Table”
The Philadelphia Education Fund (PEF), one
of the city’s major school reform support
organizations, convenes the Education First
Compact as part of its civic engagement pro-
gram. The Compact, established in 2002,
brings together civic and community leaders
and advocates from across the city for a
monthly discussion of education issues. The
Compact is supported by the William Penn
Foundation, which has invested many of its
resources in developing a more robust civic
community for school reform. 
Explicitly created to contribute to the building
of civic capacity for school reform in the city,
the Compact has evolved over time into a
forum where the city’s nonproﬁt service and
advocacy groups share information and learn
about and discuss district policies and prac-
tices. While participants value this function, it
is limited in terms of building civic capacity.
Our discussion of the Compact will show that
it has usefully created a “table”—a place for
groups to come together—but has yet to ﬁnd a
way to make that table a piv-
otal site for forming collabora-
tive relationships across sec-
tors, or for shaping policy.
The Compact’s identity and
purpose have also evolved
over the years. Initially, the
Compact was conceived as a
separate entity from PEF, with
the Fund stafﬁng the group
and supporting its work.
During its ﬁrst few years,
Compact chairs came from the
larger civic community, but
gradually PEF took a stronger
role in  guiding the Compact,
and, in 2004, a PEF
staff member assumed the position of chair.
As we discuss below, this repositioning of
the Compact vis-a-vis a major nonproﬁt organ-
ization with its own relationship with
the School District of Philadelphia, has
 narrowed its original role and its mission. 
During the Compact’s formative ﬁrst two years,
there was also a great deal of discussion about
what role the School District should play, with
some members advocating a formal member-
ship and inviting a representative of the CEO
to every meeting, and others arguing that
School District representatives should be seen
as “guests” at the meetings they attended. No
formal decision was ever made, but over time,
school ofﬁcials have become frequent guest
presenters, with the Compact participants now
in the role of consumers of information about
district policies and practices. Put in the posi-
tion of presenting and, at times, defending its
policies, School District participants are not in
a collaborative relationship with other groups
around the Compact “table,” a relationship
that would contribute to civic capacity. As a
result of the frequent district presentations,
Compact meetings have devoted less and less
time to prioritizing issues or coming to agree-
ment as a group on speciﬁc issues. 
To this day, Compact members disagree about
whether the Compact’s mission is to forge
agreement among groups about the future of
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education in the city or to share and dissemi-
nate information. Ideas about the mission also
have evolved over time as leadership and
stafﬁng have changed. Interviews with PEF
staff reﬂect the sense that the group is still
searching for its mission. For example, one
PEF staff-member commented that, early on,
the purpose of Compact meetings was to
“inform stakeholders on pressing issues in
public education and to build a collective
voice to inﬂuence policy in the School District
of Philadelphia and beyond” (March 2007).
Another believed that the Compact could serve
as an “outside” group in which members can
“join arms or join agendas” where appropriate.
This person regarded the Compact as a place
where ideas would be shared and then dissem-
inated to the members’ various constituencies.
“It was our expectation that they [members]
would bring information and would be con-
duits of Education First Compact work back in
their own worlds” (February 2007). 
During its early years, when many members
viewed the Compact as an action organization,
the group did arrive at consensus around a
small number of issues and mobilized partici-
pants to take action. For example, the
Compact was an important supporter of the
Teacher Equity Campaign, which advanced the
notion that the School District needed to
ensure equity in the distribution of qualiﬁed
teachers across the system. The Compact also
supported the youth organizing groups’ efforts
to establish small schools, and especially
helped make sure that schools in the organiz-
ers’ neighborhoods would be a priority. More
recently, however, the Compact has become,
as one PEF staff put it, a place solely to “bring
members up to speed” on information perti-
nent to the district (March 2007). 
PEF and many other Compact members have
multi-layered relationships with the district,
many holding contracts with the district for
services such as curriculum development,
evaluation, or after-school programming.
These member organizations need to maintain
smooth day-to-day working relationships with
the district to be effective in their work. The
shift to Compact meetings becoming primarily
informational responded to this need and has
helped contain, though not altogether elimi-
nate, controversy and conﬂict. 
Members of the Compact currently ﬁnd them-
selves torn between two roles: 1) as an insider,
assisting the district in implementing programs
and reform and 2) as an outsider involved with
the broader school reform community, keeping
watch on the greater public good. In particular,
because many of the Compact groups have con-
tractual relationships with the school district,
the organization as a whole is ambivalent about
taking public positions on issues. As early as
2004, members expressed concerns about “los-
ing” other members who did not want to be
publicly associated with particular stances. As
one district administrator commented, “so many
of these people live off the school district,
they’re fueled, funded off the district. It would
be great,” he continued, reﬂecting on how com-
promised many members with contractual rela-
tionships with the district feel, “to get a group
of folks who can make decisions about what’s
best for kids instead of the sustainability of the
Compact or of their individual organizations”
(February 2007). As this district ofﬁcial sug-
gests, Compact participants are constrained by
their focus on their groups’ individual issues
and well-being, which means the Compact
“table” is limited as a place for generating the
kind of collective vision necessary for civic
capacity. This observation mirrors our own,
both here and in previous reports, about the
effects of a contracting regime.74
In turn, district leadership, including members
of the SRC and the CEO, used the Compact as
a mechanism for communicating with external
groups. PEF’s credibility as a supporter of
school reform made the School District’s top
leadership—past Chair James Nevels and other
SRC members as well as former CEO Paul
Vallas—a willing guest at Compact meetings,
where they shared information about pressing
issues and new policies. In 2005-06, for exam-
ple, a district ofﬁcial presented at almost every
meeting. However, rather than presenting 
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policies under development in order to incor-
porate Compact input, the School District
reported on policies and plans (concerning
such areas as student promotion from grade-to-
grade or a strategy for choice within School
District regions) that were either about to be
presented to the SRC or were already in place. 
In many ways, then, the Compact now serves
as a “sounding board” that helps the district
avoid controversy. As one member explained,
[The Compact is a place to] discuss
issues in advance of them becoming
too controversial. … obviously it is
better if it never comes to that—if
the district comes to the table and
solicits our input before we stand up
and raise our hand and say “Why did
you do that? That wasn’t a good
idea” (March 2007). 
The Compact serves to alert the district to
issues that might generate a negative public
reaction, particularly from equity-oriented con-
stituencies, thus helping the district manage
dissent and avoid negative publicity. While
some Compact members expressed concern
about this approach, district presentations have
continued to dominate the meetings. Analysis
of Compact minutes over the past several years
shows a steady decline in actions or decisions,
and a commensurate rise in presentations by
district staff and others. Largely question and
answer sessions, these presentations leave little
time for participants to consider the issues,
reach consensus, or take action. As a sounding
board for the School District, the Compact has
shifted away from the idea of being a place for
groups to work with the district collaboratively
on developing or revising policy. 
Still, the Compact has been successful in
attracting a signiﬁcant group to its monthly
meetings, usually between 25-40 participants
from leading advocacy, service and communi-
ty groups. As one PEF staff commented, 
The idea was to bring together people
on a regular basis, people from several
“buckets,” a loosely coupled group in
terms of supporting issues for improv-
ing public education together … higher
ed, CBO, advocacy, business, and com-
munities of faith (February 2007). 
Over time, the nonproﬁt advocacy, service
community, and education reform groups have
come to dominate the Compact membership,
with some representation from city agencies
and area colleges and universities. For active
groups, the Compact provides a valuable serv-
ice, allowing them to stay current on district
reform measures and share information and
strategies with other organizations.
Other groups, though, have not joined the
Compact “table.” There is scant business
involvement, little participation by communi-
ties of faith, few neighborhood groups, and lit-
tle racial and ethnic diversity among partici-
pants as well. Compact staff members contin-
ue to do outreach, especially to groups repre-
senting constituencies of color. However, its
leadership has concluded that some sectors,
like the business community, do not see the
Compact as a place to achieve its goals. For
this reason, PEF recently organized a separate
group of business representatives. As one PEF
staff explained, 
The conclusion … [was] that the
business community thinks in a dif-
ferent way … . So we’ve made an
effort to engage the business com-
munity in a different conversation…
more on their terms (March 2007).
With membership limited to advocacy, service,
and community organizations, the Compact’s
work is largely isolated from other city issues
or constituencies. In our interviews with busi-
ness and other leaders throughout the city, we
learned that many of them had only a passing
knowledge, if any, of the Compact and its mis-
sion. Those familiar with the Compact, some
of whom had even attended a few meetings,
viewed the Compact’s work as marginal or
unfriendly to their own concerns. 
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Discussion
In creating and funding the Compact, PEF
and the William Penn Foundation sought
to build infrastructure for civic capacity for
school reform. While this case study has pointed
out the many ways the Compact falls short of
this vision, it is important not to overlook the
Compact’s major contribution, which is the
creation of a “table” that brings different groups,
including the School District, together to talk
about educational issues. In fact, though the
Compact has not spoken with one voice, it has
served to facilitate the ability of member
groups to meet separately with the district
about policies that raise equity concerns.
Member subgroups have also come together to
support the district around key issues, such as
city funding for education. In addition, PEF
staff use the Compact network to share activi-
ties of the member groups, which sometimes
challenge district policies and practices.
There are several reasons the Compact has
been unable to build upon these achievements
to have more of an impact on education policy
or on the broader civic environment. First, the
Compact developed an adaptive strategy for
dealing with the School District to accommo-
date the complicated contractual or partner
relationships many of its members have with
the district, in effect, keeping the Compact
from relating to the district as an equal.
Second, the on-going ambiguity about the
Compact’s purpose has made it difﬁcult for the
group as a whole, or even individual members,
to express dissenting opinions. Third, a frac-
tured civic landscape coupled with the dis-
trict’s tendency to use Compact forums as
symbolic, rather than meaningful, public
engagement provides an additional set of
obstacles. 
The Compact’s inability to enlist members
from outside of the nonproﬁt sector, particular-
ly the city’s business or civic elite, is another
concern from a civic capacity perspective. Not
only does this limit the Compact’s impact, it
also means that conversations at meetings are
largely among “like-minded” people, people
who work in the same general area and share
the same core values. These conversations do
not expose members to contrasting views or
allow them to work through multiple agendas
for the schools and the city. Thus the very
encounters necessary for the development of
civic capacity—particularly given the tensions
in Philadelphia between growth- and equity-
oriented agendas—are not happening at
Compact meetings. For all of these reasons,
and despite the good efforts of many thought-
ful people, the Compact has been unable to
mobilize an array of cross-sectoral actors
around shared priorities for school reform.
Conclusion
Each of the groups we have discussed here is
performing important work and each, in its
own way, is attempting to deal with the chal-
lenges facing the city and its schools. Indeed,
these cases represent only a small sample of
the myriad of organizations involved in educa-
tion in the city. The large numbers of individu-
als and groups working on behalf of educa-
tional improvement is reason alone for encour-
agement. A lack of energy or commitment on
the part of the civic and community sectors is
not the problem in Philadelphia.
But as studies of civic capacity in other cities
point out: “The primary obstacles to systemic
school reform are not a lack of clever ideas,
indifference to education, or a lack of a will-
ingness to try new things. The primary obsta-
cles are political in nature; they are rooted in
the fact that various groups have distinct inter-
ests that often lead them to work against each
other in ways that dissipate energies and blunt
reform efforts” (Stone, et. al, 2001). Our
“The primary obstacles to systemic school reform are not
a lack of clever ideas, indifference to education, or a lack
of a willingness to try new things.  The primary obstacles
are political in nature; they are rooted in the fact that var-
ious groups have distinct interests that often lead them to
work against each other in ways that dissipate energies
and blunt reform efforts"   —Stone, et. al, 2001
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analysis of the four case studies conﬁrms this
assessment and provides further insight into
the challenges to building civic capacity in
Philadelphia. Here we focus on four key factors. 
• First, each group is operating in a certain
amount of isolation from one another and/
or other segments of the civic or business
community. This is consistent with a long-
documented tendency in Philadelphia civic
life towards parochialism, such that organi-
zations and neighborhoods focus only on
their own interests and agendas and ignore
broader, citywide issues.75 As a result, indi-
vidual groups’ efforts are not coalescing to
generate the sort of widespread resolve and
mobilization the city so badly needs.
• Second—and related to the problem of
 isolation—organizations in Philadelphia
seem to be occupying fairly extreme posi-
tions on the economic growth-equity con-
tinuum. Perhaps because there is so little
cross-talk or collaboration, the groups we
have described here (with the exception,
perhaps, of BAEO) seem to ﬁnd themselves
entirely in one camp or another, either
throwing their weight behind growth-orient-
ed policies or arguing that any investment
in afﬂuent areas is inequitable. As a result,
there is little discussion among these play-
ers of the ways in which both growth and
equity are important or how to move
beyond this divisive issue towards a shared
vision of civic well-being. 
• Third, our case studies show that some
groups are better positioned than others to
pursue their agendas with respect to the dis-
trict. In  particular, those groups that—like
the CCD and BAEO—have political or
material resour ces to offer the district, or
who can bring the district status or prestige,
have increased access to district leaders. In
contrast, groups that do not have such
resources—the youth groups and, to a lesser
extent, the Compact—must struggle for
access or to be treated as equal partners.
Because the current district context is char-
acterized by behind-closed-doors decision
making, groups that have the ability to
reach leaders and whose agendas ﬁt with
the district’s are much more successful in
achieving their goals than groups that must
rely on other approaches, such as communi-
ty organizing or dialogue. Thus, there is an
imbalance in the voices that contribute to
setting the education improvement agenda.
• And ﬁnally, the expansion of contracting
out district functions to external groups has
“particularized” the role of many groups,76
and as the Compact case study illustrates,
served to greatly complicate—or even dis-
courage—collective action around mutual
interests in relation to the district and
school reform.
As we have indicated throughout this
report, civic capacity requires the par-
ticipation of both elite and non-elite
constituents, and collaboration on the
part of the district. Particularly in
urban areas, where low-income
neighborhoods are disadvantaged in
multiple ways, the development of a
shared agenda, so important for civic
capacity, is impeded when these voic-
es are not heard. When this occurs,
school reform efforts repeatedly lack
the understanding, commitment, and
participation of those who ultimately
assure that school improvement
efforts are carried out and reach everyone. It is
this kind of reach that reforms must have in
order to lay deep roots, beneﬁt those that have
historically been most disadvantaged, and
meet broadly deﬁned community interests. 
Thus, though this chapter has shown that
Phila delphia’s students and parents have many
allies across the city, the task remains to har-
ness their energy more effectively and for
greater equity. 
As we have indicated
throughout this
report, civic capacity
requires the partici-
pation of both elite
and non-elite 
constituents in 
collaboration with 
the district.  
75 Whiting, B. (1999, May). Philadelphia: Prospects 
and Challenges at the End of the Decade. Phila delphia,
PA: The Pew Charitable Trusts; Whiting, B. J. & Proscio,
T., 2007. 76 Bulkley, K. E., 2007.
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Opportunities and Obstacles
Building Civic Capacity 
This report was undertaken to assess the state
of civic capacity for education reform in Phila -
delphia. As we have deﬁned it, civic capacity
involves three elements: 
• First, members of the community under-
stand that public schools are part of a larger
community framework. As a result, they are
willing to transcend the speciﬁc needs and
interests of their own constituency or group
to deﬁne a set of educational goals that rep-
resent a collective good. 
• Second, the processes for setting an agenda
and making decisions require the broadest
possible participation, bringing citizens from
different social positions and sectors of the
city into agreement about shared goals. 
• And, ﬁnally, these diverse participants must
be mobilized to generate resources and cre-
ate the momentum to  forward school
improvement efforts. Mobil ization depends
on the collaboration of the different sectors
of the community, each as equal participants
on a level playing ﬁeld, with minority and
low-income groups or neighborhoods work-
ing alongside those in positions of power. 
In Philadelphia, we ﬁnd both good news
and bad news for civic capacity. A general
sense of cautious optimism about the city and
its prospects spills over to education as well.
Signs of Philadelphia’s resurgence, particularly
in the downtown and surrounding neighbor-
hoods, are echoed in the School District by a
sense of change and momentum. And the rea-
sons behind this optimism suggest that some
of the important elements that contribute to
civic capacity and that support and sustain
reform are present in Philadelphia.
As this report has demonstrated, however,
many of the elements contributing to civic
revival and educational improvements have
also created serious obstacles to civic capacity
and thus, to long-term, comprehensive, sus-
tainable reform. As we have detailed in
Chapter One, the focus of city leaders on the
middle class and on Center City development
has divided the city against itself. While the
city has never been uniﬁed, it now has
embraced a market approach to revitalization
that intensiﬁes divisions among neighborhoods
and exacerbates a dichotomy between improve-
ment efforts that promote economic growth
and reforms that promote equity. Groups active
around education, no matter where they fall
on the growth-equity continuum, are focused
almost exclusively on the interests of their
separate constituency or groups. This has con-
tributed to an absence of discussion about how
best to meet the needs for broader community
well-being. In addition, as Chapter Two and
Chapter Three illustrate, the School District, in
following a market-oriented model, adopted
modes of interaction with parents and commu-
nity members that reinforce hierarchy, privi-
leging the district and powerful “partners”
while weakening the potential for all involved
in the city schools, particularly those who rep-
resent low-income constituencies, to collabo-
rate on an equal playing ﬁeld. The district’s
emphasis on “customer service” helps to meet
the individual needs of families and children,
but does not encourage families to participate
in collective interactions aimed at system
improvement. Further impeding collaboration,
the district’s authoritative, top-down manage-
ment style and accompanying lack of trans-
parency in decision making leaves no means
for the public to participate in setting criteria
for decisions affecting education policy. In
other words, public accountability, essential
for building civic capacity, has been notably
absent in the privatized environment of the
School District of Philadelphia. 
Chapter 4      41
Public accountability, essential for
building civic capacity, has been
notably absent in the  privatized
 environment of the School District
of Philadelphia.
79 The Philadelphia Public School Notebook is an
independent nonprofit news service that produces a
quarterly newspaper. 
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The challenge to Philadelphia, then, is to capi-
talize on the opportunities for civic capacity
that have come out of the recent reforms,
while taking steps to ameliorate the obstacles
that we have described above and elaborated
in this report. The citywide activities of par-
ents, youth, school reform, and community
groups in response to the most recent budget
crisis are encouraging.77 Their calls for greater
input into budget decisions and for a role in
selecting the next district CEO are testament
to the desire and energy of local actors to
work with educational leaders to ensure that
school reform succeeds. However, if this ener-
gy and mobilization is to extend beyond the
moment and beyond those leading the current
effort, many more of Philadelphia’s citizens
need to join the effort. If this is to happen,
new resources must be found to support com-
munity outreach activities. 
Philadelphia is at a critical juncture in shaping
its future. There is energy and momentum
around the city’s economic growth and an
inﬂux of young leaders who could potentially
work with, rather than parallel to, a new city
administration.78 In education, the state
takeover has fundamentally shaken up institu-
tional arrangements and alignments. This
means that there now exist new avenues for
working with the public schools, as well as
many fresh actors. As we pointed out above,
contracting, partnerships, and charter schools
have provided new entry points for participa-
tion with the School District and have
increased the number and range of players
involved in education in the city. The groups
in the case studies we have discussed here are
among the many organizations in Philadelphia
committed in different ways to helping
improve education in the city, supported by a
philanthropic community committed to build-
ing informed civic and community engage-
ment around issues of public education. In
other words, there is no shortage of activity
around education in Philadelphia. However,
these assets have not coalesced to overcome
the obstacles to civic capacity that we have
detailed in this report. Below, under four guid-
ing principles, we offer recommendations for
an effort to address the obstacles to civic
capacity in Philadelphia: 
1 Transparency 
In order for all groups to work on an even
playing ﬁeld, they need the same information
about district plans and priorities and they
need to be able to evaluate what works and
what does not. The School District’s privatiz-
ing environment particularly needs to include
some mechanism for public accountability. 
• The School District must provide the public
with clear and timely information about its
decision making. 
• The city’s media must go beyond simply
reporting School District accomplishments,
and instead track and inform the public
about district decision making. This may
require in-depth investigative reporting of
the stories behind district-dispensed infor-
mation. In this regard, the Philadelphia
Public School Notebook has been exempla-
ry, particularly in examining the district’s
contracts.79
• The advocacy, parent, and youth groups
who have already been pressing for greater
transparency will have to continue their
efforts, joined by others in the civic com-
munity. In order to keep lines of communi-
cation open, they should work in collabora-
tion with, not in opposition to, the district. 
2 Collaboration
Civic capacity assumes that education is a
community enterprise, with a broad base of
groups active in charting neighborhood and
77 This report did not closely examine school-based
involvement of parents or others, but focused on the
broader district context for reform.
78 Whiting, B. J. & Proscio, T., 2007.
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citywide directions committed to strategies for
improving education. Civic capacity requires
all those involved to see beyond their own
interests to create agendas that serve all citi-
zens. In Philadelphia, as in many other cities,
leaders working for the well being of a city
often do so from a limited perspective, based
on their own constituencies, political or eco-
nomic ideologies, or geographic boundaries. If
the city is to move forward and ﬁnd solutions
that address economic growth and equity,
more collaboration and less competition is
essential.
• The new mayor has an opportunity to pro-
vide leadership that will bring together key
actors from different sectors to devise a
broad-based agenda for revitalizing the city.
This agenda must be coherent and go
beyond the self-interest of each group.
Representation is needed from civic, busi-
ness, and community groups, as well as dis-
trict leadership, front-line educators and
their unions. 
• The School District must participate in the
broader urban agenda, joining more fully
and deliberately in forums on housing and
neighborhood development, health and wel-
fare, and economic development across the
city to discuss the city’s future.
• The School District must rethink its rela-
tionship to the public and devise practices
for interaction that facilitate collaborative
relationships. Its top administrators and
governing board need be open to meaningful
exchange with a range of groups that goes
beyond symbolic events, public relations, or
customer service. 
• The School District should continue to
encourage involvement, innovation, and
entrepreneurial efforts of external groups
interested in working with it, without creat-
ing a competitive climate that discourages
collaboration. 
• The city’s coalitions working for education-
al reform must expand to include the lead-
ers of sectors concerned about economic
growth. The philanthropic community has
supported coalition building and can exert
pressure to increase collaboration across
issues.
• Civic groups, the district, and city govern-
ment should look to other cities for models
of collaboration and mobilization for school
reform, such as El Paso, Mobile, and
Boston, which all offer useful lessons from
which Philadelphia could learn. 
3 Inclusiveness
While any public school district, and
Philadelphia is no exception, has to consider
how to serve the broad range of students that
make up its population, planning for doing
that rarely includes representatives that reﬂect
that diverse population in real decision mak-
ing. Our study has pointed out how, in the cur-
rent School District conﬁguration, elite and
powerful groups are more likely to have their
agendas recognized than those that are less
powerful. The resulting reforms, then, lack
wide commitment and often overlook the
needs of low-income, minority communities;
or they have negative consequences for these
communities. Including these groups in plan-
ning is crucial for broad-based civic capacity. 
• The School District and any governing or
planning group that is established to for-
ward an agenda for public education in the
city must include groups that range across
interests and lines of race and class. Any
“table” that is established must represent
low-income and less powerful constituen-
cies, including parents and youth, and take
their concerns seriously; it also must be a
space in which groups can disagree or air
grievances without fear of exclusion. 
• More powerful groups must expand their
limited agendas, as well as share their
resources of inﬂuence and capital, to incor-
porate broader goals. 
• Community-based groups that have been
successful in coming to the table around
issues such as housing and community devel-
opment need to include education on their
agendas and contribute to shaping an educa-
tion agenda.
• The philanthropic community can encourage
inclusiveness in its guidelines for funding.
4 Mobilization
Civic capacity, as the scholars who developed
the concept emphasize, involves the power “to
get things done,” not power “over” others to
force action.80 In Philadelphia, we unfortu-
nately have a long history of planning—sum-
mits, forums, task forces—and reports that
have not resulted in action. We believe the
city—its government, business, labor, higher
education and other leaders, community-based
groups, advocacy organizations, parents, and
students—can use their power to get things
done and move forward with broad public
 participation. 
• The mayor and other city leaders must
move beyond crisis mode when dealing
with the public schools and concern
 themselves with education as a long-term
endeavor. Efforts in Philadelphia to bring
people together around a common table
must also include follow-through. 
• The mayor or other entities that take on
education reform should look to other cities
for examples of successful mobilization.
What worked elsewhere may not necessari-
ly work in Philadelphia, but successful
examples demonstrate that mobilization for
school improvement is possible, while
offering lessons and principles for
Philadelphia to draw on in devising locally
appropriate strategies. 
• Lasting school reform requires not just a
group of elites making decisions, but
 mobilization of the wider citizenry
through ongoing means such as community
organizing, neighborhood forums organized
by  recognized community associations,
and the like. This broad-based, inclusive
strategy develops the deep roots necessary
for gaining  commitment that will sustain
the work over time. The philanthropic 
community must see these efforts as worth
funding and nurturing in, and of, them-
selves. They provide the sustenance for
civic  capacity that, in turn, generates gen-
uine, comprehensive, enduring reform. 
As we have shown in this report, Philadelphia
faces unique challenges to building civic
capacity. Yet without civic capacity, it will be
difﬁcult—if not impossible—for the School
District of Philadelphia to motivate and fund
reform, assure the stability of the schools,
 sustain reform efforts, and guarantee that all
students have access to high-quality teachers
and programs and thus the opportunity to
acquire the knowledge and skills necessary
for success. Building civic capacity requires
weathering conﬂict, negotiating compromises,
and ensuring that all voices are heard. As
Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, we are all
bound together in an “inescapable network of
mutuality.” To a large degree, the success of
current and future efforts to improve the city’s
schools will depend upon Philadelphians’
 ability to recognize and build upon the many
ways in which our destinies are intertwined—
with one another and with the city as a whole. 
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This study used qualitative research methods,
including interviews, observations, document
review, and case studies. The research was
conducted in three overlapping phases:
• First, we conducted dozens of interviews
with local civic actors over a several year
period. Our design included two rounds of
interviews with civic, political and commu-
nity leaders, once early in the reform peri-
od, and then later on, as reforms were
implemented. In total we conducted inter-
views with 67 leaders, 12 of them twice.
We used the categories developed by Stone,
et al., in their 2001 multi-site study of civic
capacity to select our interviewees, making
sure we had a number of representatives
from each of the sectors Stone and his co-
authors identiﬁed as critical to civic capaci-
ty: General Inﬂuentials, Education Program
Specialists and Community Based/
Advocacy leaders. 81 (See Chart A below
for the distribution of interviewees among
these categories) These interviews focused
on respondents’ views of the reform and
civic engagement in the schools and, in the
second round, their understanding of the
relationship between the schools and the
city’s future economic development.
• Second, we supplemented these with an
additional set of seven interviews conducted
between fall 2003 and fall 2006 with district
administrators, two of them twice, to see
how they characterized the relationship of
the district to the public. We also drew on 4
interviews from our general research to
inform this research question. Chart B below
includes a description of these interviewees.
We also observed the bi-monthly meetings
of the School Reform Commission, where
we took ﬁeldnotes that included a focus on
the Commission’s practices for interacting
with the public. These interviews and 
observations allowed us to examine how the
district’s changing institutional structure
shaped its relationship with the public.
• Third, we conducted four case studies of
local organizations involved in education
issues to explore the “on the ground”
dynamics of civic activity around education
reform. Chart B below provides a snapshot
of the diversity of these groups in a range
of dimensions, including constituency, geo-
graphic orientation, theory of action, agen-
da, and interests. Two of the case studies, of
the Center City District and the youth
organizing groups, were part of larger stud-
ies. Each involved dozens of interviews
with those directly involved in the efforts of
each group, observers of their efforts, and
District personnel familiar with their efforts.
Observations of the activities of the groups
were made over several years. In both
cases, key program documents were
reviewed. The Center City District study
spanned 2004-mid-2006 and the youth
organizing 2003-2006. The case study of
BAEO was based on research conducted
between July 2005 and August 2006. We
conducted individual interviews with 11
people afﬁliated with BAEO, including top
staff, board members and parents, as well 
as a focus group with 5 parents. We also
attended and observed 5 BAEO events (one
of which was in 2003), including parent
workshops. We have been participant
observers of the Educa tion First Compact
since its inception in 2002, and between
then and February 2007, observed 39 meet-
ings. In June 2006, the Philadelphia
Education Fund agreed that the Compact
could serve as a case study, and we supple-
mented observations with interviews of 7
participants, and 7 other non-participants
who were familiar with the Compact’s
work. We analyzed Compact minutes from
meetings spanning February 2003 to
February 2007. In addition to the work
detailed here, we drew on data about the
case studies from our interviews with 
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81 Within the category of “Influentials” were city,
state, business, civic, religious and media leaders;
“Education Program Specialists” included those
from the School District of Philadelphia as well as
from among groups external to the district;
“Community Based/ Advocacy” leaders were those
from community and advocacy groups. 
business, labor, higher education and other
leaders in the city. 
• Also, we collected and reviewed relevant
press clippings throughout the period of the
study. 
Interviews were semi-structured and generally
took from one to one-and-a-half hours, and
were later transcribed. Observations were one
to two hours and recorded as ﬁeldnotes. Using
a qualitative software program, Atlas ti, to
code the different data sets, we were able to
identify perceptions about the city and public
education, and activities and actions that build
or impede civic capacity both within each data
set and across the data  corpus. We also com-
pared our case studies across key dimensions
(including theory of action, constituency,
means of gaining access to the district, and
goals), enabling us to identify the factors asso-
ciated with an organization’s  success or  failure
in achieving its agenda. 
Analyses occurred in three major stages: the
ﬁrst analysis contributed to a paper presented
at the Urban Affairs Association in 2004
(Simon, E., Gold, E., Mundell, L., Riffer, M.,
& Cucchiara, M.), the second in a 2005
Research Brief, Time to Engage? Civic
Participation in Philadelphia’s School Reform
(Gold, E., Cucchiara, M., Simon, E., & Riffer,
M.) and the third in the current report, A
Philadelphia Story: Building Civic Capactiy
for School Reform in a Privatizing System
(Gold, E., Simon, E., Cucchiara, M., Mitchell,
C., & Riffer, M.). 
The analysis for this report applied the con-
ceptual framework for civic capacity estab-
lished by Stone and his colleagues which
posits the main elements of civic capacity to
be: a multi-sectoral group, including low-
income groups, which can form a shared set of
interests or agenda, and an inclusive mobiliza-
tion to forward those interests or agenda. Our
analysis, which examined civic capacity for
school reform in an era of privatization, also
drew on the work of Minow82 and Sclar83
which provide frameworks for examining the
public’s role in monitoring public resources
in a market economy and from Katz’s work
on the late 20th century turn towards market
 solutions to social problems.84
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82 Minow, M., 2003.
83 Sclar, E. D., 2000.
84 Katz, M. B. (2001). The Price of Citizenship:
Redefining the American Welfare State. New York:
Henry Holt and Company.
Number of 
Sector Interviewees Male Female White Black Latino Asian
General Influential-General 15 7 8 9 6 0 0
General Influential-Business 10 5 5 9 1 0 0
Education Program Specialist- 9 3 6 4 4 1 1
School District of Philadelphia
Education Program Specialist-General 12 4 8 4 8 0 0
Community-Based/Advocacy 10 6 4 3 2 4 0
General Influential-City Government 5 3 2 3 2 0 0
General Influential-State Government 3 1 2 1 2 0 0
General Influential-Media 3 1 2 2 1 0 0
Total 67 30 37 35 26 5 1
Categories were determined by the position of the interviewee at the time of the interview.
Chart A: Interviews
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Number of 
Sector Interviewees Male Female White Black Latino Asian
School District of Philadelphia 11 3 8 4 6 0 1
Chart B: School District of Philadelphia Supplementary Interviews
Type Partnership between
business improve-
ment district and
the School District
of Philadelphia
Student activist
groups
Local branch of
national nonprofit
organization.
School reform
 organization.
CCSI Youth Organizing BAEO Compact
Constituency Families and chil-
dren in the School
District of Philadel -
phia’s Center City
region
Students at three
neighborhood high
schools
Citywide low and mid-
dle-income African
American parents/stu-
dents
Citywide advocacy and
nonprofit support
organizations
Geographic
 orientation
Center City region of
the School District
of Philadelphia
(downtown & adja-
cent neighborhoods)
Three low and
lower-middle income
neighborhoods 
Citywide 
(part of a national
organization)
Citywide
Interests/agenda Downtown revitaliza-
tion, middle class
attraction, expan-
sion of school
choice.
Equity & access to
high quality educa-
tional opportunities
as part of neigh bor -
hood improvement. 
Equity, opportunity,
educational choice
Equity, civic
 engagement
Primary Theory
of Action
If professional
 families are provided
with enhanced school
choice, they will
choose to remain in
the city rather than
move to the suburbs
for better schools.
This will benefit the
city as a whole by
bolstering its tax
base and attracting
businesses.
If youth leadership
and adult alliances
are formed in the
neighborhoods and
across the city, the
district will be pres-
sured into commit-
ting to break down
large schools into
small schools, equi-
tably distribute
resources and be
accountable to the
local community. 
If high-quality school
choice options in -
crease and low-
income Black par-
ents are both edu-
cated about making
school choices for
their children and
financially able to
take advantage of
those options, then
choice can be a
lever for greater
equity in education-
al opportunities. 
If a group of
diverse public
school stakeholders
can come together
around shared
issues, they can
 create demand for
both equity and
quality in district
policies and support
the district by pres-
suring government
or other relevant
external entities. 85
85 There was significant variation among members of the Compact about the group’s purpose, but
this was the most generally shared theory of action. 
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